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Visual perception dominates the philosophical study of perception. This dissertation shows that a 
complete understanding of the nature of perception as a general category requires a consideration 
of the nature of the bodily modalities such as interoception, proprioception, pain, touch, and 
thermoception. By understanding these modalities, we come closer to understanding the nature 
of perception (what it is, how it works, and what systems it encompasses). While non-visual 
modalities have been gaining more attention in philosophy, much of this work looks to 
philosophical issues particular to these modalities—not necessarily how they relate to questions 
about the nature of perception in general. Thus, despite increasing work on non-visual 
modalities, visual perception still maintains as the dominant model of what perception—in 
general—is like, for visual perception is so commonly and unquestioningly used as a model for 
perception as a phenomenon.  
 
The overarching strategy of this dissertation is to analyse the similarities and differences between 
the bodily senses and uncontroversially perceptual faculties (such as vision and audition). Then, 




modalities—mean for understanding the nature of perception. It shows that claims about visual 
perception cannot and should not be uncritically extended to perception in general if perception 
in general includes the bodily modalities, for the bodily modalities do not necessarily work in the 
exact same way as vision. It also shows that there are good reasons for thinking that the bodily 
modalities belong in the perceptual category and are thus relevant to understanding perceptual as 
a general phenomenon. However, it does this in slightly different ways in each chapter, each with 
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Visual perception dominates the philosophical study of perception. In this dissertation I show 
that a complete understanding of the nature of perception as a general category requires a 
consideration of the nature of the bodily modalities such as interoception, proprioception, pain, 
touch, and thermoception. By understanding these modalities, we come closer to understanding 
the nature of perception (what it is, how it works, and what systems it encompasses). While non-
visual modalities have been gaining more attention in philosophy, much of this work looks to 
philosophical issues particular to these modalities—not necessarily how they relate to questions 
about the nature of perception in general. Thus, despite increasing work on non-visual 
modalities, visual perception still maintains as the dominant model of what perception—in 
general—is like, for visual perception is so commonly and unquestioningly used as a model for 
perception as a phenomenon.  
 
The question of whether the bodily modalities are the same kind of thing (in some sense) as 
visual perception has also been underexplored philosophically. An exception to this might be the 
philosophical literature on pain; work on the perceptuality of pain typically assesses pain 
alongside criteria from visual perception, such as whether the phenomenal state—pain 
experience—represents anything ‘in the world’ in the way that vision and audition do. However, 
this has not yet given rise to the question of whether this is the right approach, that is to assess 
pain alongside vision as a test of its perceptuality. Basically, pain could be perceptual in some 
sense and yet not conform completely to a visual model. One distinctive aspect of the approach 




understand what the bodily senses are like as individual modalities that then form a type of 
perception that is bodily perception. From there, we can assess whether this type of perception (if 
it really can be called a type of perception, which I think it can, but that will be seen) belongs in 
the same category as vision and is thus relevant to philosophical debates typically centered on 
vision.  
 
Because bodily perception, such as pain, is often assessed alongside a picture of perception 
coming from vision, philosophical work on the bodily modalities has not really taken a body-first 
approach to understanding the nature of perception. That is, there is little work looking at what 
the bodily modalities are like in themselves and then assessing their relationship to 
uncontroversially perceptual modalities like vision as well as their relationship to perception as a 
general category. Assessing bodily modalities alongside strictly visual criteria for perceptuality 
has tended to mischaracterize the nature of the bodily modalities and, often, misrepresent the 
ways in which they might be like vision somewhat but not exactly like vision. Basically, this 
means that the hyper-visual focus in defining perception has gotten in the way of truly 
understanding the bodily modalities and, potentially, perception in general. While a comparison 
of the bodily senses to vision is necessary and interesting, assuming that visual models are 
definitive characterizations of what perception is like misses that there may be different kinds, or 
types of perception, that work in slightly different ways yet have some of the same 
characteristics.  
 
The overarching strategy of this dissertation is thus to look at the similarities and differences 




audition), and then seeing what these differences and similarities—the relationships between the 
various modalities—then mean for understanding the nature of perception. I show that claims 
about visual perception cannot and should not be uncritically extended to perception in general if 
perception in general includes the bodily modalities, for the bodily modalities do not necessarily 
work in the exact same way as vision. I also show that there are good reasons for thinking that 
the bodily modalities belong in the perceptual category and are thus relevant to understanding 
perceptual as a general phenomenon. However, I do this in slightly different ways in each 
chapter, each with a different focus.  
 
In the first chapter, I focus on defining the nature of the bodily faculties and identifying their 
epistemic value. Mainstream analytic philosophy of perception has been concerned with the 
epistemic aspects of perception, but this discussion has mostly focused on vision. Specifically, a 
main part of the epistemology of (visual)perception seeks to make sense of the fact that 
perception generally gives us accurate representations of things in the world and yet, is 
sometimes illusory. The epistemological dimensions of perception have not really been extended 
to the body, with the exception once again being probably pain. Some might think that the bodily 
senses, because they do not give us veridical representations of things in the world (that is, things 
outside of the perceiver herself), have no positive epistemic role to play. Indeed, there is a 
history of the body and the bodily as being deemed antithetical to the rational and objective, 
distorting what would be otherwise rational and factual representations. I challenge such a 
perspective. This chapter thus gives an epistemological treatment to the bodily senses, first 
seeking out their nature as compared to non-bodily senses. Then, it explains that, despite being 





In the second chapter I address the philosophical distinction between sensation and perception, 
particularly the view that sensation and perception are different types of processes and thus that 
the bodily modalities are sensory modalities, not properly perceptual modalities. I begin by 
explaining the origins of sensation/perception distinction, before then detailing two recent 
accounts that invoke a sensation/perception modality-type distinction, asserting that the bodily 
modalities are sensory and therefore not properly perceptual. I then use examples from the bodily 
modalities to assess whether this type of view is right. I end with a proposal for accommodating 
varying intuitions and pieces of evidence pertaining to the perceptuality of the bodily senses: that 
perhaps perceptuality and sensationality exist on a spectrum.  
 
In the third chapter I address the issue of the perception/cognition border and assess whether 
theories of the nature of the perception/cognition border can explain the bodily senses, 
particularly somatosensory perception. I begin by explaining the debate about the existence and 
nature of the perception/cognition border. Next, I survey leading theories on the nature of the 
border as well as those which deny the existence of a border. I analyze whether these theories 
can explain the nature of somatosensory perception as a type of perception that is distinct from 
cognition. Finally, I provide a potential alternative that may avoid any issues of previous 










The standard view of successful perception is that it represents things to the perceiver as they 
exist in the world outside of her. Unsuccessful perception—perception in which the object is 
represented other than how it is in itself—is taken to be a philosophical problem, one that must 
be solved or explained away if perception is to maintain its epistemic status as giving us correct 
information about perceiver-independent objects. The main point of this chapter is to argue that 
the bodily senses ought to be distinguished from the non-bodily senses in virtue of the fact that 
they necessarily represent subjective information; but perception as subjective (or relativistic) is 
not at odds with perception’s epistemic function. The bodily/interoceptive senses, while 
generally giving us subjective or relativistic information, give us valuable information. Indeed, 
understanding the nature of the bodily senses leads us to acknowledge and thus understand the 
value of subjective perception and subjective knowledge.  
 
1. The standard picture of perception 
 
A major area of focus within contemporary analytic philosophy of perception has been how to 
square perceptual illusions with the well-held commitment that perception gives us truthful, and 
thus accurate, representations of its objects.1 That perception functions in an objective, 
 
1 While skepticism concerning the possibility of our perceptual faculties misleading us has deep 




externally-sensing, and representational way has been how perceptual faculties such as vision 
and audition have been distinguished from mere sensory capacities which might provide feelings 
or information to an organism, but not represent external objects in a way that is objective and 
consistent (transparent) among perceivers.2  
 
Given this traditional way of thinking about perception, what are we to make of the 
interoceptive/bodily modalities, such as proprioception, pain, touch, thermoception, vestibular 
perception, and interoception? Such modalities tend to (although touch and pain seem to be both 
interoceptive and exteroceptive) give us information about internal, physiological states, or about 
the body in relation to external objects, rather than represent external objects as things in 
themselves. Thus, an intuitive way of thinking about the difference between the bodily faculties 
and non-bodily faculties (such as vision and audition) is that the bodily senses detect and 
represent internal, subjective information, while the non-bodily senses detect and represent 
external, objective information. Indeed, this intuition is reflected in how the term “interoception” 
is used. The first use gives it a narrow meaning, intended to pick out the feeling of information 
from one’s internal organs and functions, such as one’s heartbeat or, or the feeling of 
indigestion.3 The second use, however, is taken to refer to the perception of any bodily 
information, such as bodily position or sensations on the skin.4 Vision, audition, and the 
 
external objects--like how a change in perspective can make the shape of an object look 
different) destabilizing our faith in the accuracy of perception gave way to the so-called 
“problem of perception.” 
2 For instance, Burge (2010) argues that objectivity is a defining feature of perception.  
3 As Kuhle (forthcoming) points out, while bodily senses like proprioception have been gaining 
more philosophical attention as of late, interoception is still relatively underexplored in 
philosophical work on perception.  
4 Tactile information is an interesting case, for it can sometimes represent bodily information but 
sometimes represent external, non-bodily information (such as the texture on a piece of 




chemical senses (gustation and olfaction) are typically thought of as exteroceptive, and thus 
externally-sensing, faculties. They detect objects and information that comes from objects that 
are outside/independent of the perceiver.  
 
Is this intuitive way of thinking about bodily perception correct? There are a few ways which 
would initially suggests it is not. While the narrow sense of interoception does indeed seem to fit 
the bill, and seems to be categorically internal and private, bodily perception per se is not 
necessarily distinguishable from vision or non-bodily faculties on the basis of its lacking 
externality or publicness.  This is because, in bodily perception, the body can be represented as a 
mind-dependent feature of the world and can thus be thought of as external to the perceiver 
herself. Those who put cranial constraints on the mind could argue that the body, like a coffee 
cup or table, is an object which exists externally to and independently of the mind. Certainly, the 
body as object can exist without the mind (as in death, perhaps) which suggests that the mind and 
body are at least separable or distinct in some way. What’s more, features of the body such as 
position, shape, and size can be perceived by others. My proprioceptive system might perceive 
my bodily position from a different modality and perspective than the way you represent it 
visually, but technically we both perceive its position. Thus, it seems that prima-facie, the bodily 
senses ought not to be defined by internal-ness.  
 
Another factor potentially problematizing the distinction between bodily and non-bodily as 
internal and external is the fact that bodily perception routinely requires visual information. 
Indeed, as perceptual illusions such as the rubber hand illusion (which will be explained below) 
 





show us, visual input is often necessary for the perception of body ownership (Ehrsson 2020). 
There are more common examples as well, such as the simple fact that one can and does visually 
perceive one’s own body and its parts. However, the multimodal nature of bodily representation 
suggests that, at least in some cases, visual information helps to create the felt sense of 
ownership over one’s body. Maintaining the distinction according to the intuitive differences 
between bodily and non-bodily (primarily visual) information appears to, at least initially, have 
some problems.  
 
The rubber hand illusion—an illusional of limb ownership—demonstrates the multi-modal 
nature of body ownership perception. The illusion, first documented by Botvinick and Cohen 
(1998), features the tactile stimulation of both a subject’s actual hand, which is hidden to the 
subject, and a rubber hand, which is visible to the subject. Both real and rubber hands are given 
synchronous touches (such as strokes from a paintbrush), which, in conjunction with the 
perception of the rubber hand as the visible hand, causes the subject to feel like the rubber hand 
belongs to her body. This classical version of the experiment (there are other versions which 
need not be explained at present) relies on the subject’s visual input as dictating the bounds of 
the self and thus, of body ownership. The tactile stimulation together with proprioceptive input 
and visual cue of the rubber and as that which is receiving the stimulation, produces the feeling 
of the rubber hand as belonging to one’s body. What the illusion shows, is that vision can be part 
of what produces the perception or sense of body ownership, and thus, bodily perception per se 





While vision can be used to perceive one’s body, and thus suggests that distinguishing bodily 
from non-bodily sense by an internal/external distinction is perhaps not right, I will argue that 
there is a feature of bodily perception and bodily sense which can serve to define the phenomena. 
I argue that bodily perception is necessarily subjective, but in a particular sense of the term.  
 
 
2. Subjectivity and subjective perception  
 
Bodily perception is necessarily subjective. While the term is often used with negative 
connotations, as suggesting no standards of truth or correctness, “subjective” here is taken to 
mean of or relating to the subject. While there are many different definitions of “subjective,” 
when I refer to subjective perception I am not speaking of a lesser form of perception, but of the 
perception of the subject’s bodily states.5 Bodily perception is also necessarily relativistic.6 
Similarly, when I use the term “relative” or “relativistic perception” I am referring to perception 
that represents information as relative to the perceiver, such as the phenomenon of Peripersonal 
Space (PPS) perception, the perception of the space surrounding one’s body. What research on 
PPS shows, is that the perception of our own bodies in a sense extends to space and objects 
 
5 Interestingly, “subjective” is also defined as mind-dependent, meaning anything produced by 
the subject herself is subjective. In this sense, all perception and thought is subjective. This 
definition works too, but the definition I have chosen works better because it highlights the 
intuitive difference between how we tend to think of exteroception such as vision and audition as 
primarily giving us information about the world as it is independent of us.  
6 One could argue that all perception is necessarily relativistic. That might be true, but that’s not 
the standard picture that analytic philosophy of perception has presented. Indeed, perception is 
often (rightly or wrongly) treated as a relatively disengaged phenomenon in which objects are 
perceived as they are in themselves. While work on things like cognitive penetration has 




within a certain distance of the body. Thus, a cup within my reaching distance is perceived as 
relative to—perhaps even an extension of—my body.7 
 
The detection of subjective information and the representation of subjective content are defining 
characteristics of the bodily senses/bodily perception. Defining bodily perception in this way 
allows us to keep our initial intuition—which I think is widely held—that there is something 
distinctive about bodily perception as a type of perception. However, it does not require any 
external/internal divisions, which as we have seen, present at least potential problems.  
 
It is important to emphasize that the way in which bodily perception is necessarily subjective 
does not necessarily imply that it only represents private content. While bodily information is 
often private, it is not always. This leaves room for the types of perceptual information 
mentioned previously, which is perceivable from a variety of viewpoints and from different 
faculties, such as one’s bodily position or shape. While the body is a perceptual object and is 
thus objective in some sense of the word, perceptual content of or about one’s body is 
necessarily subjective in the way I have previously defined. Sometimes this is private, sometimes 
it isn’t, but neither are necessarily included or precluded by the way I am using “subjective.”  
 
It is also important to emphasize that the relevant use of “subjective” does not necessarily 
suggest, as some definitions do, that subjective information features some alteration or bias from 
the subject. Similarly, as I will eventually show, the subjective nature of bodily perception does 
not mean that there are no standards of veridicality for bodily representations or bodily 
 
7 Some research suggests that held objects are represented as bodily extensions. See Miller & 




information. This is an interesting problem, because, while the bodily senses might represent 
information as different from how it exists independently of the perceiver, it isn’t clear that this 
kind of thing is actually a biasing of the process, because it seems that the sensory/perceptual 
systems often just function in this way. For instance, certain areas of my body are more sensitive 
to tactile stimulation than others, which results in certain areas representing the same stimulus in 
different ways. But this isn’t a kind of malfunction, bias, or illusion, because this is exactly how 
the system is designed to work.  
 
Indeed, any kind of top-down effects on, say, tactile information, would operate on tactile 
information as it is given by the tactile system. The difference in sensitivity between body parts, 
for example, is not really an alteration of sensory/perceptual content, but a feature of the 
stimulus/perceptual object as it is represented by the tactile system. Thus, the sense in which 
bodily perception is subjective does not suggest that it is biased or interpreted in a way other than 
as it truly is (or as it is supposed to be, given how the systems work). While top-down effects on 
bodily perception seem possible (even common), this is a separate issue which will not be 
addressed by this paper. So, subjective perception is not necessarily perception that is modulated 
by the top-down influence of extra-perceptual information. Subjective perception could be 
modulated by top-down factors, but these are distinct phenomena and thus distinct concepts.  
 
Interestingly, bodily perception seems to muddle the very categories of subjective and objective, 
since they are typically framed as in opposition to each other, and yet seemingly, in this case, 
they are not opposing. Different ways of representing bodily information could perhaps result in 




Maybe the objective and the subjective (in the senses I am using them here) are not mutually 
exclusive. That being said, bodily perception as necessarily subjective does not mean that bodily 
information cannot be represented objectively in the two senses just discussed, but just that it is 
necessarily subjective in my sense of the term. Accordingly, when I speak of “objective” 
perception, I am referring to perception that is not of or about the subject. Basically, perception 
that is objective is just perception that is not subjective (for the purposes of this paper). While the 
body is a perceptual object of sorts, I will be emphasizing the subjective nature of bodily 
perception for this paper. Most cases of visual perception, like the seeing of inanimate objects, 
would be paradigmatically objective. Not because they are necessarily more truthful or grounded 
in reality but because the objects are just that—objects—and those objects are not, in any sense 
of the word, subjects. The way in which they are truthful is perhaps more simplistic; truthfulness 
for a visual perception is simply correspondence to the thing perceived. For bodily perception, it 
is a bit more complex, an issue that we will turn to in section 4.  
 
Recognizing the subjectivity of the bodily senses marks a departure from the traditional focus of 
the epistemology of perception, much of which has been concerned with how to account for the 
fact that perceptual faculties (such as vision) are supposed to, yet don’t always, represent the 
mind-independent world as it is in itself. In other words, how to account for the epistemic 
problem of supposedly truth-tracking or veridical faculties producing perceptions which do not 
correctly represent the thing perceived. Focusing on bodily perception shows us that the 
representation of information other than as it is independently of the perceiver serves important 
functions, such as maintaining homeostasis. Thus, subjective or relativistic perception, far from 





For instance, Kathleen Akins (1996) argues that sensory systems are narcissistic. They represent 
external qualities as relevant to the organism of which they are part. In other words, they do not 
track objective properties of the environment, but track properties as they relate to meeting the 
needs of specific organism, such as maintaining homeostasis. Particularly, Akins uses the 
example of thermoception. Thermoreceptors do not objectively track external temperature. There 
are certain areas of the body that are more sensitive to temperature than others, because of a 
greater number of thermoreceptors. When you slowly wade into a cold pool, the water feels 
colder when it reaches your groin area, not because it is colder, but because this part of your 
body is more sensitive to temperature. This example of the “aboutness” of sensory systems runs 
counter to the way that philosophers have typically thought about the representational goals of 
sensory systems: that they are to mirror objects and properties in the external environment.  
 
What Akins’ treatment of thermoception shows is that the bodily/interoceptive senses 
problematize the traditional philosophical picture of intentionality. They represent, but they tend 
to represent information about, or as relative to, the perceivers own body, rather than 
independent features of the world as distinct from the perceiver. Another example that illustrates 
the narcissistic, or relativistic nature of bodily perception is the now familiar phenomenon of 
Peripersonal Space (PPS) perception. Research on PPS suggests that the brain creates 
functionally distinct spatial representations of the space immediately surrounding our bodies 
(and of particular body parts as well), integrating somatosensory information with visual 
information (di Pellegrino & Làdavas 2014). PPS representations are narcissistic in the way that 




information about nearby objects for manipulation and use. And the perception of an object as 
relative to a part of my body once again does not quite fit with the traditional conception of 
intentionality favored by philosophers, and thus the traditional epistemic picture of how 
perception (particularly successful perception) functions. The distance from my hand to the cup 
in front of me is the distance relative to my body. The cup is in my PPS and thus is not 
necessarily perceived as an abstract feature of the world but as something in relation to me, the 
perceiver. What PPS shows is that even in cases of bodily exteroception, objects can be 
perceived as relative to one’s body, and are not necessarily independent representations of 
objects and properties as a traditional philosophical view of perception would suggest. 
Nevertheless, the perception of an object as relative to the perceiver is still informative. It 
represents features of the world—just relative to the perceiver. After all, the perceiver is still part 
of the world, and subjective relations between an object and a perceiver are still valuable and 
epistemically informative, even if they are relative and subjective. External objects, if they are in 
our ‘orbit’, are obviously perceived as relative to ourselves. We do not perceive the distance of 
external objects as relative to nowhere. Even exteroceptive senses can and do use the body as an 
anchor of aboutness.  
 
Another way to think about the way the bodily senses function is in terms of strategic 
rationality. It has been argued that the rationality of emotions is strategic rationality, as emotions 
often function in ways that propel us toward particular, agent-oriented goals (de Sousa 1987). A 
main goal of the bodily senses is to maintain homeostasis, and thus, the way that information is 
represented through the bodily senses will be in service of this goal. As such, we have cases like 




will maintain the necessary temperature. Or, as in the case with tactile sensitivity, areas such as 
the hands are more sensitive than the rest of the body, which serves obvious evolutionary 
functions. The increased sensitivity or relativistic nature of the bodily senses may, on some 
reading, look like a distortion of the way things are objectively or in themselves. But unlike the 
cases of perceptual illusion, they ought not to be considered distortions or malfunctions. Indeed, 
the relativistic or narcissistic way that the bodily senses work is how they are supposed to work; 
it is how they are designed.  
 
The fact that the bodily senses characteristically represent information about the individual or as 
relative to the individual, and do not necessarily mirror objects in one’s environment, seems to 
lead to questions about whether the bodily senses represent at all and whether they count as 
properly perceptual.8 What the examples of thermoception and PPS show is that even 
exteroception in many cases does not function in the way that perception has tended to be 
framed. Perception necessarily involves the perceiver and their subjective relationship to the 
thing perceived. And this doesn’t mean perceptual failure; it’s just how a lot of perception works. 
Furthermore, the subjective or narcissistic way that faculties/senses work often serves a purpose, 
aiding our functioning/survival. The subjective or relativistic functioning of certain senses serves 
valuable purposes. For example, if PPS perception did not represent space and objects in that 
space as relative to my hand, I would not be able to grasp my coffee cup with speed and ease. 
Basically, perceiving something other than as it appears in the world serves a purpose. It is not 
an epistemic problem, as philosophy of perception has tended to treat such phenomena. 
Relativistic perception serves a valuable purpose.  
 





Throughout the history of philosophy, the body has been treated as in opposition to the rational 
mind. Indeed, the feminized body as a source of irrationality has been a popular view held 
throughout the history of philosophy.9 Thus, the rational subject, that which the history of 
philosophy has primarily promoted, is a disembodied, universal subject (Anderson, Ellen, 
Willett, & Meyers 2020). It has been one goal of feminist philosophy, then, to illuminate the 
particularities of embodied subjectivity, and how those particularities (race, class, ability, 
gender) contribute to our experiences and knowledge. In addition, some work by feminist 
philosophers has focused on the value of subjective knowledge and questioned the well-held 
dichotomies of subject/object, emotion/reason, mind/body, and male/female. This work has been 
relevant for creating a conception of the subject as embodied and socially/culturally/temporally 
located. The traditional, universal subject that dominated the history of philosophy was one that 
did not contain the embodied or situated particularities that defined the feminine. Thus, this work 
has made possible the identification of bodily information as information about the subject. Not 
the subject’s body, as a dualistic picture would suggest, but of the subject herself.  
 
Some feminist philosophers—particularly feminist philosophers of science and feminist 
epistemologists—have recognized the epistemic value (indeed, necessity) of subjectively 
accessed information.10 The subjective (like the bodily vs the mental, the emotional vs the 
rational), has a long history of treated as lesser than, and antithetical to, the objective. The 
assumed “view from nowhere,” associated with the supposed objectivity (i.e., disengagement) of 
 
9 For a discussion of philosophy’s historical treatment of the body and its connection to 
femininity, see Bordo (2003).  
10 For instance, standpoint theorists emphasize that one’s social position allows them to access 




things like scientific inquiry, is both impossible and epistemically problematic. Specifically, 
feminist philosophers such as Antony (1993) and Haslanger (1993/5) question the assumptions 
that knowledge requires a separation between subject and object, as well as an aperspectival 
position. When the subject of inquiry is oneself, there is no subject/object distinction to be made. 
If knowledge were to require a distinction between the knower and the known, self-knowledge 
would be impossible. Relatedly, not only is aperspectival knowledge impossible, assuming it as 
the only epistemically respectable position erases the inevitable influence of subjective values 
and beliefs in every process of inquiry. Failing to recognize the inevitability, and in some cases, 
value of subjective influence, is therefore more likely to distort our perspectives than it is to give 
us privileged ones.  
 
There are parallels between the view of objectivity argued against by feminist philosophers and 
intuitions about perception as necessarily the process of representing objective (in the sense of 
aperspectival, not subjective) information. Thinking of perception as necessarily the process of 
gaining information and knowledge about things in themselves precludes subjective perception 
from having epistemic value. Indeed, it may contribute to the tendency to preclude bodily 
perception from being properly perceptual at all. However, I argue that the bodily senses, 
through their detection and representation of subjective and relative information and content, 
have both epistemic and practical value. This goes against the assumption that perception—like 
science—has value only insofar as it represents the objects of inquiry as things in themselves, 
independent of the perceiver. Subjective perception, intrinsically inseparable from the 
perceiver’s position or perspective, is not a lesser, imperfect form of perception, but a type of 




include the subjective knowledge gained through the bodily senses. As the rest of this paper will 
show, subjective perception is not at odds with perception’s epistemic function, but a component 
of it.  
 
3. The contents of subjective perception 
 
3.1. The origins of subjectivity 
 
We already know that there is something special about bodily perception in that it represents 
information about or as relative to a subject. In addition to this aspect of its distinctive nature, the 
bodily senses make possible our own experiences of subjectivity in the first place (cite on 
interoception and subjectivity). The only reason that there is a phenomenal quality to conscious 
experience, even conscious experience of some external, subject-independent object, is because 
there is a felt sense of subjective, first-person experience underlying it all; a sense that you are 
going through it. And the bodily senses likely make this very feeling—the feeling of subjective 
experience—possible. For instance, Kühle (forthcoming) argues that, because interoception (in 
coordination with other senses—although some believe interoception to be fundamental to the 
process) makes possible the feeling of being a subject, that we should look to the body as 
underlying phenomenal consciousness. Thus, the “hard problem” of consciousness is not so 
much a problem confined to the brain, but a problem that may be solved by looking to the body. 
As the rubber hand illusion shows, the bodily senses coordinate to dictate the bounds of our 
subjectivity by dictating the bounds of our bodily self. Without the bodily senses, it is plausible 




belonging to me or coming from my perspective. One of the ways in which bodily perception 
serves us, then, is by making possible the very perspective underlying our conscious experiences. 
Body ownership is also crucial for distinguishing the boundaries of the self from other external 
perceptual objects.11  
 
The bodily senses are fundamental in that they underly all subjective experience. They form the 
sensory substrate for experience in general. For instance, we can block sensory input to our eyes 
or to our ears, and still maintain a stable feeling of being, because our bodily sensory systems are 
still working to process bodily information. While a lot of bodily perception does seem to happen 
beyond conscious control and awareness, this just lends credence to its fundamentality: it makes 
possible the other, more consciously controlled and often more phenomenologically salient 
sensory experiences such as visual ones. If it is true that the bodily senses underly phenomenal 
experience, the bodily senses underly the ability to have all other kinds of perceptual experience. 
When philosophers speak of what it is like to see red, they are speaking not just of a visual 
experience, but an experience which relies on the bodily senses to make it what it is.  
 
Next, we’ll look to some of the particular contents of subjective perception. In other words, the 
types of things (objects if you will, although that language might be confusing) that subjective 
perception is about. In addition, this section will also outline the value of these different sources 
of subjective perceptual information, by highlighting what sorts of things they make possible, or 
contribute to.  
 
 
11 See de Vignemont (2017) for an in-depth discussion of how touch and pain create the feeling 




3.2. Interoception, bodily function, and health. 
 
Interoception—the perception of internal states of the body—is becoming a very popular subject 
of inquiry. But what exactly is interoception? Earlier on, I briefly explained the distinction 
between narrow and wide uses of the term, but interoception is quite a complex topic, so a more 
comprehensive description may be useful here: 
 
Interoception refers to the process by which the nervous system senses, interprets, and 
integrates signals originating from within the body, providing a moment-by-moment 
mapping of the body’s internal landscape across conscious and unconscious levels. 
Interoceptive signaling has been considered a component process of reflexes, urges, 
feelings, drives, adaptive responses, and cognitive and emotional experiences, 
highlighting its contributions to the maintenance of homeostatic functioning, body 
regulation, and survival (Khalsa et al. 2018).  
 
Clearly, interoception does a lot. It seems to perhaps be a lot of different things as well. That is 
why researchers (e.g., Ibid) call for the importance of an interoceptive taxonomy. Indeed, 
interoception is a very broad category—one that may need some finer-grained distinctions as it 
becomes more well-understood. However, such distinctions aren’t necessary for us at this point, 
because we are concerned more with what interoception and interoceptive information help us 
do.  
 
Perhaps the main function of interoception is its role in the processing and perception of internal 
signals relevant to basic bodily functions. For example, interoceptive perception allows us to 
detect hunger so that we know when we need to eat. Another example is that it allows us to 
detect when we need to use the bathroom. Without proper interoceptive capacities, we would not 




for survival and general well-being. Knowledge (either consciously accessible or not) of what 
signals our internal processes give us is necessary for maintaining homeostasis and thus survival. 
More basically, interoception allows our brains/minds informational access to what is happening 
internally on a variety of physiological levels. Some of this is information we are consciously 
aware of (our heartbeat), and some is not (metabolic processes), but all of it is extremely 
important for functioning and functioning well.  
 
Interoception thus plays a large role in the overall maintenance of bodily health. One interesting 
example from experimental literature is the idea that sickness behaviours (SBs), such as fatigue, 
reduced fluid intake, fever, and low mood, are direct responses to interoceptive signals caused by 
inflammatory conditions (Quadt et al. 2018). SBs like fatigue, malaise, and social disconnect are 
associated with neural activity in known interoceptive brain regions, such as the mid-insula 
(Ibid).  
 
Research on rodents in experimentally provoked inflammatory states suggests an interoceptive 
mechanism connecting inflammation response and associated behavior. Similar research in 
humans suggests the same. For instance, one experiment gave participants injections of either 
typhoid vaccine or a placebo. Then, participants underwent fMRI imaging while performing the 
Stroop task—which requires subjects to name the color of ink that a different color word is 
written in. Basically, “GREEN” could be shown in red ink, and the subject would need to name 
the color of ink, not the color word. The Stroop task is cognitively demanding, for we tend to get 
confused by the conflicting color information, wanting to name the color word itself and not the 




vaccine injection, and the task would be extra challenging. But that is exactly what the 
experimenters were looking for:  
 
Performance of the Stroop task under inflammation activated brain regions encoding 
representations of internal bodily state. Spatial and temporal characteristics of this 
response are consistent with interoceptive information flow via afferent autonomic fibers. 
During performance of this task, activity within interoceptive brain regions also predicted 
individual differences in inflammation-associated but not placebo-associated fatigue and 
confusion (Harrison et al. 2009 p. 1).  
 
Brain imaging thus showed strong activation in interoceptive brain regions in the inflammatory 
group, which correlated with inflammation-induce fatigue and confusion. Accordingly, strong 
activation in interoceptive brain regions looks to be causally related to inflammation and 
inflammation-related behaviors. This led the experimenters to conclude that there is likely an 
interoceptive link between inflammation and sickness behaviors, just like has been demonstrated 
experimentally in rodents. While a complete neurobiological and psychophysiological 
understanding of interoception and its connection to subjective illness-provoked feelings is still 
in its relative infancy, it is certainly plausible that interoceptive activity plays a big role in 
production of the relevant SBs through the detection and facilitation of the body’s pro-
inflammatory response. Specifically, it is thought, by sending information through the vagus 
nerve. The vagus nerve is the main component of the parasympathetic nervous system, and an 
incredibly important vehicle for body-brain communication.  
 
Although this type of interoceptive activity caused by the body’s inflammation response (that 
which causes/facilitates SBs themselves) is going on beyond our conscious awareness, the 
subjective feelings themselves (such as fatigue) are felt because of a conscious awareness of 




response and go on to perform the relevant behaviors the SBs are supposed to initiate (such as 
resting), we need to be able to consciously detect the relevant bodily feelings. Feeling sick is 
basically the detection of various bodily feelings—those which are thought to occur because of 
unconscious interoceptive signaling from the body to the brain. We need to be able to detect the 
physiological changes that the brain then initiates, to then necessitate the more motivational (or 
lack thereof) behaviors characteristic of sickness.  
 
SBs are thus interesting and relevant here because they are clear cases of subjective responses 
caused by physiological changes. Feeling tired, sad, and withdrawn when you are sick is the 
result of your immune system provoking these responses through inflammation and are thus 
characteristic body-to-brain interactions. And these subjective feelings associated with sickness 
serve an important function physiologically: to signal disruption and instigate resting and energy 
conservation. Basically, interoception serves us in this case by informationally provoking 
sickness related behaviors, and then, by allowing us to feel the sickness related behaviors 
themselves. The epistemic and functional role that interoception plays in our lives is not to be 
understated, although interoception as an epistemic sense has not been previously explored.  
 
While I am using the relationship of SBs and the body’s inflammatory response as a specific 
example, pretty much any signal from the body (particularly internal state of the body) to the 
brain requires interoception or interoceptive coordination. And then, information consciously felt 
as bodily requires interoception as well. Thus, it should be clear that interoception gives us 
necessary information—both consciously accessible and not—about the internal functioning of 




example illustrating this, by showing the different levels of interoceptive activity that plays a 
crucial role in maintaining homeostasis through signaling when something is not right either at 
the cellular level (such as detecting inflammatory proteins and signaling this to the brain) or at 
the level of conscious experience (such as the subjective feeling of being sick).  
 
3.3. Proprioception  
 
Proprioception is the perception of bodily position. It is closely related to the perception of 
bodily movement (kinesthesia). In fact, it seems unclear whether kinesthesia and proprioception 
are always thought of as distinct, yet related, or terms used for different systems within the same 
modality. In conjunction with other senses, proprioception allows us to locate the distance of 
objects relative to the body and contributes to our own sense of body image. To illustrate, think 
about how knowing where your body is and how far it is away from objects is integral to your 
understanding of your own body’s size and its spatial extension (Taylor 2009). Proprioception, in 
coordination with other faculties such as the vestibular system, allows us to balance, maintain 
proper posture, as well as walk. Less fundamental examples include the performance of expert 
movements like dancing, performing athletics such as playing soccer or baseball. Without 
proprioception, so much of what we do every day would not be possible. Proprioceptive 
impairments can severely impair one’s ability to get around in the world, and thus, severely 
impair one’s quality of life and potential for performing certain actions and activities. Even 
though much of our proprioceptive functioning occurs beyond the level of conscious awareness 




Proprioception is also fundamental to our ability to interact with and manipulate objects in our 
environment, and thus, important for the perception of PPS.  
 
As previously stated, PPS perception is the perception of space immediately surrounding the 
body, which allows us to perform actions like grasping, without conscious attention, and with 
ease and control. It is because of our rather automatic sense of PPS perception that we don’t have 
to consciously figure out things like the reaching distance to an object. Although we may take 
this sort of thing for granted, in that it is such an integrated part of daily life, it allows us the 
ability to do a great deal of important things.  
 
                   3.4. Touch: tactile and haptic perception 
 
The faculties of tactile and haptic perception make up the ‘touch’ modality, which also 
encompasses pressure and temperature. ‘Touch’ (quotes are used because of the term’s 
colloquial nature) is composed of two subsystems: the cutaneous (tactile) and the kinesthetic 
(haptic). The cutaneous system is the outer system formed by skin and surface tissue, while the 
kinesthetic is the internal system formed of muscles, tendons, joints. Tactile perception is thus 
touch involving only the cutaneous system, while haptic perception has kinesthetic involvement 
(Kappers & Tiest 2015). As seems to be the nature of bodily perception, haptic perception is 
strongly multi-modal. While kinesthesis is “part” of haptic perception, it is also “part” of 
proprioception; in turn, each of these distinct, yet overlapping modalities can also be thought of 





Tactile/haptic perception is particularly interesting because it acquaints us with the external 
world and yet also serves the more internal, regulatory system of proprioception. Tactile and 
haptic perception (along with pain) seem to be both interoceptive (in the wide sense) and 
exteroceptive (De Vignemont, Ehrsson and Haggard 2005).  
 
The importance of haptic perception comes from its coordination with the proprioceptive system 
to enable interaction with, and the manipulation of, external objects. Actions like typing, 
drawing, and all things that involve fine motor skills such as the playing of instruments, are all 
made possible because of haptic perception. Tactile perception, on the other hand, is responsible 
(with the help of other faculties, to be sure) for defining our bodily boundaries. The skin, and the 
tactile receptors therein, form the interface between body and the external environment. Tactile 
receptors in the skin are responsible for making and maintaining our somatosensory 
representations, which thus give spatial information to other sensory states such as pain 
(Haggard, Taylor-Clarke & Kennett 2003). Without the rich sensitivity of the tactile system, we 
may not have such an acute representation of the spatial dimensions of our own body. Indeed, we 
may not have such a strong sense of subjective experience in the first place, as tactile perception 
is thought to necessitate (in coordination with other senses) the boundaries of our bodily schema 
and thus, self.    
 
We also use tactile/haptic perception—through its interesting hybrid exteroceptive-interoceptive 
nature—to perceive objects (and their features) outside of our own bodies. The tactile system is 
able to perceive information such as texture in amazing detail, particularly through areas of the 





3.5. Pain  
 
Pain plays a very important role in the lives of human and non-human animals. Most 
prominently, it alerts us to actual or potential physiological damage in our bodies. Without the 
ability to feel pain, we would not get very far in life. Indeed, those with congenital analgesia, the 
rare condition where individuals do not feel pain, have very short life expectancies. Indeed, pain 
allows us to know when something has gone wrong with our bodies. Even conditions such as 
chronic pain, which are not necessarily aligned with identifiable tissue damage, indicate 
physiological disfunction. The current theory of chronic pain suggest that it results from the 
body’s pain networks and pain receptors becoming overactive and signaling damage where there 
is none. Why exactly this happens is not quite known, but it suggests that even pain without 
tissue damage signals something going wrong internally. Pain perception thus (whether 
accurately representing tissue damage or not) informs us that something is wrong with the body 
in some way, which is very important—in fact critical—information.  
 
Pain, like emotion (a topic we will turn to next), is also important for learning what sorts of 
things are dangerous or harmful for us. We learn to avoid noxious stimuli because of the pain 
they cause. Without pain, we would not receive the alert that some stimulus is harmful to us, and 
thus, we would not withdraw from it and avoid it in the future. Pain is an extremely valuable 
epistemically, for without it, we don’t stand a great chance at surviving in the world, for we 
would not be alerted to physiological damage or disturbance that could be life-threatening. 




damaged some part of their body so that they can get proper care and rest to heal the injury. 
Without this knowledge, no steps would be taken to heal, and potentially long-term or even life-
threatening damage could result. Pain, like all bodily senses, has not thoroughly been considered 
for its epistemic value; however, it certainly ought to be. 
 
 
3.6. Bodily perception and emotion 
 
One of the main ways bodily perception qua subjective perception serves us is through its 
relationship to emotional identification and emotional knowledge. To see this, we will first have 
to get clear on the connection between the bodily senses and emotion.  
 
The James-Lange theory of emotion introduced the idea that emotions are the perceptions of 
bodily feelings or information (James 1884). Contemporary work in the James-Lange vein has 
continued to assert that the bodily/perceptual view of emotion is correct while building upon its 
core claims (e.g., Damasio 1994, Prinz 2004). While the extent to which emotions are bodily 
feelings is debated, meaning that some argue that a purely perceptual/bodily theory of emotion is 
incorrect, it seems uncontroversial that at least some aspect of emotion is perceptual.  
 
Regardless of the degree to which emotions are felt in, or caused by, the body, or whether there 
are other sources of information involved (cognitive content, for instance), emotions do involve 
bodily feelings at least to some extent. This means that emotions have a physiological, 




bodily senses with emotion and emotional knowledge. Going further, it is enough to suggest that 
the bodily senses make emotional knowledge possible. Emotional identification, the first step to 
emotional knowledge, requires the bodily senses. The specifications of how much they are 
bodily or in what causal direction the bodily parts of emotion are found in, doesn’t matter for my 
purposes. Whether these physiological changes follow from the emotion or can be thought of as 
the emotion or cause for the emotion, also doesn’t really matter for these purposes. This is 
because all that is necessary is that bodily/interoceptive perception is involved in emotional 
identification and thus emotional knowledge. And there is contemporary empirical evidence 
suggesting that this is true. So, while it is true that the bodily/interoceptive senses (particularly 
interoceptive it seems) are linked with emotion, this does not necessitate or argue for a particular 
view of emotion. Unless perhaps the view was one that states there is no 
physiological/perceptual element to the expression/feeling of emotions, but such a view is hard 
to imagine being advanced contemporarily, for it would go so obviously against empirical work 
on the issue. 
 
As I argue, perception as relativistic or subjective is not at odds with perception’s epistemic 
value. The bodily/interoceptive senses, while generally giving us subjective or relativistic 
information, give us valuable information. One of the ways that the bodily senses give us 
valuable information is by allowing us to feel, identify, and describe our emotions. While the 
degree to which emotions are perceptual is debated, emotion has (at the very least), a 
perceptual/sensory element. Thus, the bodily senses are integral for any kind of emotional 
knowledge. This is demonstrated empirically, such as through research on phenomena such as 




emotions as well as emotions in others (Brewer, Cook & Bird 2016). Alexithymia has been 
linked with deficits in interoceptive sensitivity through heartbeat detection tests. For instance, 
Herbert, Herbert and Pallatos (2011) found a negative correlation between interoceptive 
sensitivity and alexithymia. That means that lower interoceptive sensitivity correlated with a 
higher score on the Toronto Alexithymia Scale—the leading self-report measure for 
Alexithymia. Typically, Alexithymia has been understood as a cognitive disorder, framed as 
impairments in the cognitive elements of emotion such as how to describe a particular emotion. 
This research showing potential connections between Alexithymia and interoception suggests 
that it may extend to impairments in feeling the bodily signals characteristic of emotion as well.  
 
Some research suggests that the interoceptive deficits associated with Alexithymia extend to 
non-affective interoceptive information as well, suggesting that Alexithymia itself is the result—
at least in part—of a general interoceptive impairment (Ibid). A high prevalence of Alexithymia 
in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) as well as diabetes, suggest that 
Alexithymia is the result of more general sensory impairments, not just affective ones (Kojima 
2012). Because emotion involves bodily sensation/perception, the epistemic dimensions of 
emotion—the kinds of things that emotion allows us to know or contributes to knowledge of—
show the epistemic value of the bodily senses.  
 
Before moving on to a demonstration of the utility or importance of bodily knowledge qua 
emotional knowledge, it is worthwhile to say a bit about what emotional knowledge actually is. I 




to have knowledge of a particular emotional state is to know (whatever this requires) that you are 
in x emotional state at time t.  
 
To make the case that the bodily senses and bodily information have epistemic value in virtue of 
the connection between interoception and emotion, we must also make the case that emotions 
themselves have epistemic value. The following section outlines the value of emotional 
knowledge.  
 
3.6.1 The value of emotional knowledge 
 
Why is emotional knowledge important? On a historical, now less-commonly held view of 
emotional and reason as in opposition, emotion was considered epistemically destructive. It was 
once commonly thought that emotion was the enemy from reason, something that was 
detrimental to rational thought and decision making. However, we now know that emotion can 
serve important epistemic purposes, helping us to gain important information such as that which 
is relevant for decision making and self-preservation. Indeed, emotion ought not be thought of as 
in opposition to rational thought, but as a compliment to it. This subsection will outline why 
emotional knowledge—the knowledge of one’s particular emotional states—has practical import. 
Specifically, it will detail three ways in which emotional knowledge serves important purposes: 
first, a) emotional knowledge is necessary for emotional regulation; second, b) emotional 
knowledge is necessary for understanding what sorts of situations produce reward and 




emotional states (as well as others emotional states) is necessary for aspects of social cognition, 
particularly empathy.  
 
a) emotional regulation 
 
Emotional regulation is the ability to detect and respond to an emotional experience.12 Without 
the ability to regulate one’s emotions, they can become overwhelming or destructive. Children, 
for instance, typically do not have great emotional regulation abilities, and thus they succumb to 
their emotions very strongly; a child who does not get what they want has a greater chance of 
throwing a tantrum than a “normal” adult, because adults have typically learned to regulate their 
emotions (with some variation, of course).  
 
It is suggested that the “[r]egulation of emotion is inseparable from the ability to regulate 
physiological state. Both conscious and automatic emotion regulation is heavily reliant upon 
perception of interoceptive feedback” (big review article 269). This makes sense, as we know 
that interoceptive sensitivity is linked with emotional sensitivity, making the detection of the 
physiological component of emotion seem necessary for the identification of that emotion itself. 
To be able to identify and respond to an emotion, one must need to be able to identify how it 
feels in the body. Identifying how an emotion feels in the body, and being able to regulate 
emotion, requires one to feel and often alter the associated physiological goings on. An example 
of how this works is through breathing and mindfulness exercises for anxiety. Attending to and 






least makes it feel more tolerable. Evidence from mindfulness exercises, somatic therapy for 
individuals with trauma, and phenomena such as biofeedback suggest that this is true. Thus, 
emotional knowledge, through awareness of the associated physiological states gained through 
the bodily senses, is necessary for emotional regulation.  
 
b) learning  
 
How is emotion, and by extension, interoceptive/bodily perception, involved in learning? One 
way is through emotion’s role in teaching about reward and avoidance; specifically, what kinds 
of things produce reward in the form of positive emotional experiences and what kinds of things 
ought to be avoided because they produce negative emotional experiences. How this works is 
quite simple: the experience of a negative stimuli, by causing a negative or aversive emotional 
experience, teaches us to avoid such stimuli in the future. One clear way in which this happens is 
through embarrassment or shame. When caregivers give children negative feedback about an 
action they performed, this presumably produces negative feelings in the child. It feels bad to 
have your parents scold you or tell you that you did something wrong. In many cases, this should 
lead the child to refrain from engaging in similar actions in the future. It works the other way as 
well. If a child does something good in the eyes of the caregiver, they are given praise, and thus 
are motivated to perform similar actions in order to illicit the same kinds of reactions, for they 
give the child a positive or happy emotional experience. Where emotional knowledge comes in, 
is that without knowledge of the emotional states that particular events or stimuli illicit, we 
wouldn’t learn that the associated action was something that we should repeat or refrain from. If 




caregiver, we would not necessarily learn from the event. Because we know that the bodily 
senses enable emotional identification and thus emotional knowledge, the bodily senses, through 
emotion, are connected with learning—particularly social learning.  
 
Emotion is also involved in decision making. Bodily feedback accounts such as Damasio’s 
(1994) Somatic Marker Hypothesis argue, in line with the James-Lange theory of emotion, that 
the bodily signals constitutive of emotion guide decision making. Although the Somatic Marker 
Hypothesis itself is controversial, it does seem quite plausible that emotion plays some role in 
decision making, at least some of the time. For instance, there are relatively uncontroversial 
examples of emotions guiding behavior, such as something which causes intense fear being 
something we decide to avoid. We may avoid making a risky financial decision because we feel 
fear when thinking about the potential for a negative outcome. Or, alternatively, we may decide 
to donate to a charity because of the sadness or guilt we feel when reading about the charitable 
cause. This is not to say that emotion guides all behavior and decision making, but that emotion 
can indeed motivate us to perform particular actions over others. And thus, being aware that we 
feel some kind of emotional arousal at all is necessary for emotion to have a causal connection 
with behavior/decision making.  
 
c) Social cognition 
 
Interoceptive/bodily perception likely plays an instrumental role in various aspects of social 
cognition, such as in our ability to empathize with and predict the mental states of other people. 




(ToM)—the ability to represent the mental states of another agent (Ondobaka, Kilner, & Friston 
2017). The basic idea is that interoceptive information contributes to the constraining of 
hypothesized mental states (Shah, Catmur & Bird 2017). There are weak and strong versions of 
this argument. A weak version of the argument that interoception plays a role in ToM suggests 
that interoceptive information can be used in the forming or evaluating of hypotheses about the 
target state. In other words, interoceptive information helps us figure out what a likely mental 
state could be in any given instance. A strong version of this argument suggests that 
interoceptive information is required for the very representation of mental states (Ibid). I won’t 
be arguing for either view, but the weak version of the ToM-interoception hypothesis is certainly 
very plausible. Lots of evidence suggests that interoception is involved in decision making and 
empathy, both of which have overlap with ToM.  
 
ToM is basically a decision-making process that at least sometimes (some would argue all the 
time) requires one to empathize in order to represent the most likely target state. Empathy—the 
ability to participate in another’s emotional experience—will be particularly necessary for ToM 
representations involving emotional or emotion-involving mental states. If emotions involve 
physiological, interoceptive information, then empathy—the simulation or participation of 
another’s emotional experience—would seemingly require some actual or simulated 
interoceptive activity. The ability to know what it feels like when someone else is sad is due to 
our own experience of being sad. And our own experience of being sad and ability to identify a 
particular emotion is due to interoceptive information and accuracy. Indeed, a lot of research has 
focused on the connection between interoception, empathy/emotion, and social cognition (e.g., 




plays in aspects of social cognition means that the bodily senses are instrumental to how we 
interact with other people.  
 
4. The bodily senses and truth 
 
Can bodily perceptions be correct? After all, one of the main issues in traditional epistemology 
of perception is that because our perceptions of things can represent things as differently from 
how they are in the world, that we need criteria to differentiate the cases of veridical vs illusory 
perception. The correctness or success of visual perception can typically be assessed alongside 
the thing perceived and the thing perceived is generally a perceiver-independent object. We 
would then say that we have a case of correct perception when our perception matches the thing 
perceived. If there is no external perceiver-independent object causing our bodily states, how can 
we be sure that they are accurate? More importantly, what does it even mean to call them 
accurate in the first place, seeing as even bodily states caused by external objects do not mirror 
those objects in the way that, say, visual states do? Even for faculties which, under some criteria, 
might not be considered properly perceptual, such as interoception (narrow), for them to be able 
to give us important information, they must be able to be correct. Commonly, sensory 
information or sensory states are dismissed as having a feeling but lacking content, and thus 
being rather unintelligible.13 The task at hand, therefore, is to explain how bodily perception can 
be veridical or truthful if there is no reference to, or mirroring of, an external stimulus. 
Establishing standards of truth for bodily perception is a huge task. As such, this section will 
 
13 Indeed, there is a tendency to view sensory/perceptual states without reference to an external 
object as unintelligible feelings because it is thought that they do not represent anything and thus 
cannot be accurate. For example, see Matthen’s (2021) treatment of tactile sensation versus 




serve to make some progress in the direction of establishing such standards by showing that they 
exist, rather than conclusively defining what they are for each bodily modality or the bodily 
modalities as a group. It is sufficient to show that there are ways for bodily representations to be 
correct, even if the exact details of how this works is not yet completely clear. Basically, the 
main goal of this section is to show that bodily perception represents bodily information in 
various ways, and that these representations are subject to standards of correctness/veridicality 
(whatever they may be).   
 
In addition, it is likely that, to actually specify what each type of state represents, or the 
conditions for representational success, we would probably need to be able to individuate types 
of modalities in some clear way. This is not really an issue for the present task, but certainly 
something worth noting. It also shows how philosophical work on the bodily senses cannot 
necessarily be given the same kind of treatment given to visual perception.14 Certain things, such 
as, for example, specifying what accuracy looks like for visual representations, seems relatively 
straightforward as compared to the task of figuring out what accuracy looks like for 
representations from the various bodily senses.15  
 
To make progress on the sorts of questions previously posed, such as what the accuracy of a 
bodily perception would look like, we can look to cases in which our interoceptive capacities are 
impaired, or when we perceive a physiological change that does not correctly signal what is 
 
14 Although, some (for instance, O’Callaghan 2011, 2017) argue that the multi-modal nature of 
all perception means that using vision as an exemplar is going to be insufficient.  
15 I realize claiming that the bodily senses represent at all is going to be controversial. This issue 
is fundamental to the question of whether representations of bodily content can be accurate. I 




going on physiologically. For instance, feeling certain visceral sensations when one should not is 
often considered an indicator of an underlying psychological or physiological issue. The feeling 
of needing to urinate when one does not have a full bladder is a sign of a bladder or urinary tract 
infection or, sometimes, the product of anxiety. The feeling of excessive thirst, or excessive 
hunger, despite the satisfaction of these desires/needs (by engaging in sufficient eating and 
drinking) is considered an indicator of various pathologies. So, for certain interoceptive feelings, 
we can identify conditions under which they are considered veridical and non-veridical. Feeling 
a particular bodily urge when the conditions normally governing or indicating such an urge are 
not in place, would suggest that such a feeling is incorrect. The feeling of needing to urinate 
when one does not need to urinate is an instance of feeling or sensing a quality which is not 
actually there, akin to a kind perceptual illusion. And, with interoception, experiencing non-
veridical interoceptive feelings generally indicates an issue within the organism, or something 
not working properly. The feeling of something without the associated underlying physiological 
cause is an indication of a problem. So, in short, it looks like interoceptive feelings/sensations 
can be incorrect if they do not represent the associated physiological state of affairs that they are 
supposed to represent. We thus might think of veridicality conditions for the bodily senses 
(particularly interoception) as being something along the lines of: is there a physiological basis 
for this feeling? Is this state giving me information about something going on in the body, and if 
so, is it correctly signaling the physiological state of affairs that it is supposed to signal? Rather 
than a 1-1 mapping or a mirrored correspondence to a perceptual object, it looks like 





Interoceptive accuracy is typically measured through heartbeat-detection tasks, variations of 
which require individuals to detect the frequency or timing of heartbeats felt within a particular 
time frame. There are thought to be three measurable dimensions to interoception: accuracy 
(performance on heartbeat-detection tasks), sensibility (self-evaluated assessment of 
interoceptive sensitivity & accuracy), and awareness (level of correspondence between accuracy 
and sensibility) (Garfinkel et al. 2015). The fact that individuals vary in their interoceptive 
accuracy and sensibility, suggests that one can represent interoceptive activity more-or-less 
correctly.  
 
What research on interoceptive accuracy suggests is that there are two stages to interoception 
which mirror that of traditional perception: a state of affairs, or object, which is some 
physiological signal, and the representation/perception of that state of affairs or object. One can 
be incorrect about the perception of physiological changes if they do not feel when they are 
present or feel changes that do not represent the associated stimulus. One’s perception of bodily 
signals can represent a state of affairs as being the case (take the bladder infection example) 
when that state of affairs is not the case. Basically, although the case of interoception/bodily 
perception does not perfectly mirror the case of vision or traditional perception, there are still 
conditions governing successful perception because there is still content being represented or at 
least detected. It just happens to be content about the body, rather than extra-bodily features of 
the world. Furthermore, deficits in interoceptive accuracy and sensitivity have been linked with 
impairments in other areas, such as in emotional recognition, identification, and empathy. So, not 




subject to some sort of veridicality conditions, its accuracy seems to be important in a variety 
practical domains. 
 
Another example illustrating the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of bodily perception comes from 
empirical research on eating disorders. Individuals with Anorexia Nervosa (AN) have been 
shown to have impaired tactile and proprioceptive functioning, which is thought to be causally 
connected to distortions in body image (Gaudio, Brooks & Riva 2014). For instance, Keizer et al. 
(2011) found that individuals with AN performed poorly on tactile distance estimation tasks 
(basically detecting the relative size of various tactile stimuli based on how big they feel on the 
skin) as compared with a non-AN control group. They also found that higher body dissatisfaction 
correlated with a higher degree of tactile distance estimation disturbance.16  
 
What this research suggests is that one’s body image (created, at least in part, by the bodily 
senses) can function relatively truthfully or, in the case of AN, not. Individuals with eating 
disorders report feeling like their body is larger (or sometimes smaller in the case of Muscle 
Dysmorphia) than it indeed is. Patients with AN will be dangerously thin, and yet report feeling 
as though they exist in physically larger bodies than they do. What this suggests is that the bodily 
senses work to create a representation of our own body size that can be accurate or inaccurate, 
and that this accuracy depends on the functioning of various relevant perceptual modalities. This 
issue also suggests that it is likely that a truthful/accurate body image/bodily representation is 
 
16 Gaudio, Brooks & Riva (2014) present a comprehensive review article summarizing numerous 
studies on somatosensory and interoceptive impairments in individuals with AN. The relevant 
research certainly suggests that such impairments are genuinely sensory/perceptual in nature and 
have to do with how individuals detect and process bodily stimuli, rather than simply how they 
think about or judge their bodies to be. As we’ve seen, cognitive/emotional dissatisfaction seems 




somewhat necessary for psychological health because an inaccurate body image is, as we know 
from eating disorders such as AN, psychologically and physiologically destructive.  
 
What this section shows is that bodily perceptions can be correct or incorrect, but how their 
correctness/incorrectness looks a bit different than perceptual faculties dealing with exogenous, 
non-relational stimuli. For instance, assessing the correctness or truthfulness of interoceptive 
information often involves looking to what that information typically signals. It involves taking a 
holistic look at the organism and what the particular interoceptive or bodily state should 
represent. Despite connotations of the term “subjective,” subjective perception is not perception 
without standards of veridicality. Bodily perception qua subjective perception can be correct or 
incorrect, just like objective (non-subjective) perception.  
 
The veridicality or truthfulness of the bodily senses therefore ought to be understood as not 
merely a type of mirroring or correspondence, but perhaps something else. Consider Akins’ 
example of thermoception once again. Just because the body does not perceive external 
temperature in a way that mirrors the external conditions, does not mean that the body’s 
perception of temperature is incorrect or false. This is because it is tracking temperature in a way 
that coheres with how the sensory system and really the biological system as a whole is supposed 
to function. We can illustrate this once again with strategic rationality. The way that the system 
is supposed to represent temperature is according to the density of thermoreceptors at particular 
bodily locations. And so, what counts as the “correct” way to represent temperature will be 
determined by the thermoceptive system and considerations such as what part of the body we are 




given by the temperature outside, but by the sensory system itself in coordination with the 
external temperature. So to say that the body’s representation (or at least registration) of 
temperature is incorrect because it does not mirror the perceiver-independent stimulus is just 
misunderstanding what is supposed to be happening in the first place. It is putting standards or 
correctness that are misrepresenting the goal of the system. The goal of the system might be 
something like maintaining homeostasis, and so the correctness of a representation ought to be 
assessed according to that goal, not to the goal or providing an exact mirroring of external 
conditions. Incorrectness in a case like this would actually be if the body represented (or 
detected) temperature in a way that perfectly mirrored the external conditions, because that is not 
in service of the organism; such a representation or reading of temperature would be out of sync 
with the function of the thermoceptive system.  
 
This section shows that there are a variety of ways in which the bodily senses can be considered 
to represent truthfully or correctly. However, seeing this requires an understanding of the bodily 
senses which does not try to fit them into a picture of truth or veridicality that comes from visual 




Understanding the subjective nature of the bodily senses allows us to understand their epistemic 
function: giving us information that is about or is relevant to the needs of the subject. This paper 
has argued that the defining feature of the bodily senses is that they give us subjective 




dimensions of the bodily senses looking quite different from the way the epistemology of 
perception has tended to be framed, the way that the bodily senses necessarily subjective senses 





















Some contemporary philosophical employments of the perception/sensation distinction cast the 
bodily modalities (such as those that detect and process pain, itch, pressure, positionality, and 
temperature) as sensory, but not properly perceptual. On such accounts, there are sensory 
systems and perceptual systems—each bearing distinct characteristics. Sensory systems, on this 
sort of view, tend to be defined by their lack of properly perceptual characteristics. This paper 
looks at whether this way of characterizing the bodily modalities is correct. Specifically, it looks 
at whether bodily sense-information is given through representational states that bear the 
traditional hallmarks of perceptuality. First, I consider Burge’s (2010) account of perception and 
what he takes to be the features that distinguish perception from sensation. Next, I consider 
Matthen’s (2021) account of the distinction between tactile sensation and haptic perception. I 
argue that both accounts are incorrect in their categorization of bodily information bearing states 
as sensory, not perceptual. I show that despite the bodily modalities representing perceiver-
dependent information (in contrast with the perceiver-independent information typically 
represented by modalities such as vision and audition), bodily perception is much more like 
uncontroversially perceptual modalities (i.e., vision and audition) than merely sensory ones (as 
per the categorization of sensory and perceptual modalities given by Burge and Matthen). The 




Before concluding, I consider that the nature of bodily perception may demonstrate that 
perceptuality admits of degrees or of different kinds, rather than being a binary phenomenon.  
First, I give an overview of the perception/sensation distinction. After characterizing how the 
distinction is typically fleshed out, I explain Burge’s account of what allegedly distinguishes 
perception from sensation.1 Following, I go on to characterize how Burge thinks about the nature 
of the bodily senses given his criteria for distinguishing perception from sensation. Next, I 
consider Matthen’s (2021) attempt to distinguish tactile sensation from haptic perception. After 
that, I give an overview of the kind of bodily sense-information that I am talking about in this 
paper. Finally, I explain that the bodily sense-information thought of as merely sensory is in fact 
more like perception proper than is proposed. Finally, I consider a possibility that, although 
explicitly disavowed by Burge, makes sense given what we now know about the bodily senses: 
that perceptuality and sensationality might admit of degrees.  
 
Before moving on, a note about terminology. Throughout this paper I use the term “bodily sense-
information” as a neutral term to pick out information given by the bodily senses. My use of this 
term should not be taken to mean what is referred to is sensory as distinguished from perceptual, 
but to leave open whether it is perceptual or sensory.  
 
1. Sensation versus perception 
 
 





The sensation/distinction was introduced to the philosophical literature by Thomas Reid (cite). 
Prior to Reid, there was no philosophical distinction made between sensation and perception. 
Even contemporarily, the terms “sensation” and “perception” are sometimes used 
interchangeably. According to Reid, one main difference between sensation and perception is 
found in their relationship to objects. Specifically, sensation is the only mental power which does 
not have an object distinct from itself. Another way to think of this is that the act and object are 
the same in sensation.2 In perception the act of perceiving, and the object perceived, are distinct. 
The other main difference is that sensations signal objects, whereas perceptions are of objects. 
This hints at how perception and sensation are often intuitively understood: sensation is the 
stimulation of the sense organ, the ‘raw data’ that is then organized into a perceptual 
representation.3 In other words, sensation is pre-perception.   
 
Commonly, accounts of the nature of the distinction between sensation and perception typically 
reference different stages of the same process. However, some philosophical accounts seem to 
look a bit different. These accounts isolate not just stages in the same process (although this may 
be part of the picture), but sensory modalities which are genuinely perceptual versus modalities 
which are merely sensory. The distinction typically comes down to what the modalities do—the 
complexity of their processing—and what kind of information that detect. We can call these 
sensation/perception modality distinction views, and modality distinction views for short.  
 
2 We see a kind of analogous move made contemporarily, where people hold that certain 
modalities/processes—typically bodily ones--do not represent anything in the world outside of 
their experiences. For instance, that pain is not representational because it does not refer to 
anything beyond the experience of it.  
3 To be clear: Reid had a direct theory of perception. He thus may not have endorsed this kind of 
representationalist language himself, but representational is central to most contemporary 




One example of a modality distinction view comes from Burge. Burge’s Origins of Objectivity 
(2010) provides a lengthy account of what distinguishes perceptual systems and states from more 
‘primitive’ sensory ones. Early on, Burge notes that things like pains and tickles are not 
perceptual states, but sensory states. The systems, processes, or modalities responsible for things 
like pains or tickles do not (cannot, at least on their own) produce genuinely perceptual states, 
genuinely perceptual states and systems being those which possess the relevant perceptual 
characteristics, such as representationality (more on this to come). Believing that I am in pain, or 
that I feel a tickle, is an example of a representational state that depends on non-perceptual 
sensory experiences, like feeling pain or feeling a tickle. What determines things like pain or 
tickles as sensory yet not perceptual is the fact that they are not representational states in 
themselves but can be part of representational states (like beliefs). My belief that I am in pain 
represents a particular state of affairs as being the case, but pains and tickles themselves, 
allegedly, do not.  
 
Central to perception—according to Burge—are that genuinely perceptual modalities create 
objective representations through various constancy capacities. Constancy capacities such as 
shape or colour constancy allow perceptual systems to represent objects and their properties as 
invariant despite variance in perceived stimuli. For Burge’s account, we might think of them as 
objectifying capacities, for they are responsible for the objectifying representations found in 
perception.4 Burge’s conception of objective representation is that it makes perception what it is, 
distinguishing it from sensory discrimination/stimulation. Sensory modalities are those which 
 
4 Burge’s conception of constancy mechanisms and the role they play in his overall picture is not 
necessarily a generic understanding of what constancy mechanisms do. They are, for Burge, 
necessarily linked with objectification. A different understand might link them with something 




register stimuli (and may even correlate with behavior) but do not engage in the objective 
representation via the constancy capacities unique to perception.  
 
Representation, meanwhile, is distinctively associated with veridicality conditions; 
representational states are those which represent a state of affairs correctly (or not). Sensory 
states, for Burge, do not represent and thus do not have veridicality conditions. They do not 
represent because they do not objectify via constancy mechanisms. While there is a tendency to 
apply representational explanation to all sorts of things (what Burge calls the “deflationary 
tradition”) true representation has some kind of explanatory necessity. In other words, a 
phenomenon that would make sense without a representational explanation is not truly 
representational. Just because one can explain a phenomenon in deflated representational terms, 
does not mean it is truly representational. For Burge, veridicality, representation, and 
objectification (through constancy) are necessary (and possibly sufficient) for perception. 
However, he notes that none should be taken as an individual criterion, for they are inextricably 
linked in making perception what it is.  
 
1.1 Burge and the bodily senses 
 
According to Burge, pain, thermoception and proprioception are non-perceptual sensory systems 
(p. 372). It is likely that itch and pressure would also be in the same category. The reason for 
their categorization as non-representational systems is quite simple: most prominently, they don’t 
represent. Because they do not represent, they also do not engage in the other necessary aspects 




Burge, be sometimes involved in genuine perception through coordination with other modalities, 
but they themselves are merely sensory. In sum, they are not genuinely perceptual because they 
do not objectively represent through the employment of constancy mechanisms.  
 
For these modalities, there is allegedly no distinction between act and object.5 There is no way 
for the system to distinguish the source of stimulation from their sensory effects. And thus, there 
is no representation, no constancy, nor objectification, at work. He explains this point using 
thermoception:  
Like pain sensors, these sensors provide signals from proximal stimulation that register 
information that correlates with effects on the animal body. There is no systematic 
distinguishing between objective sources of information and sensory effects of conditions 
in the individual. The heat and cold sensors are sensitive to fast changes in heat and cold, 
to danger levels, and to relative differences in heat and cold stimulations. Constancy 
capacities are not prominent (Emphasis mine, 416).  
Here Burge seems to be conflating sensory stimulation with the processing and registration (I am 
tempted to say representation, but that would be question-begging) of temperature information. 
No doubt they are related, but it is not plainly obvious that they are identical. Just like retinal 
registering is not sufficient for perception, the stimulation of thermoceptors in the skin is not 
sufficient for thermoception. This distinction can be illustrated well with pain, for pain is not 
identical with nociceptive stimulation, nor is nociceptive stimulation sufficient for pain. It is 
possible for nociceptive stimulation to occur without turning into actual pain.6 As such, we likely 
 
5 Recall, this is a characteristic of sensation given by Reid as well.  
6 Nociception is the stimulation of nociceptors, which must then send signals up the spine to the 
brain. Nociceptive signals must then be processed by the brain for pain to occur. Pain involves an 
unpleasant affective component in addition to the sensory/discriminative component 
(nociception). If something disrupts this process, like an injury, nociception can occur without 
turning into pain. This can be thought of along the lines of pain being the perception of 
nociceptive signals. Also, importantly, pain from injury requires nociception, but pain such as 
chronic/neuropathic pain can occur without nociception. Nociception is thus necessary, but not 




have two distinct things: the sensory stimulation and the associated state (what I would call the 
perception, but at this point am trying to use neutral language). Regardless, the fact that he thinks 
there is no distinction between act and object for what he thinks of as sensory systems is telling 
as to why he would consider such systems as sensory but not perceptual. Furthermore, for things 
like thermoception and pain, there often is an objective cause of the sensory stimulation. The 
contact between the perceiver and the object causing thermoceptive or nociceptive stimulation is 
an objective source of information, even if the way that this information is processed/modulated 
by the individual perceiver depends on the way the system works. In other words, while there 
may be no objective representation of some perceiver-independent object, this does not mean 
that there is no separation between the sensory stimulation and some later, information-bearing 
state. Nor does it mean that there is no objective source of the stimulation. In thermoception, and 
in pain, we can distinguish between the cause and the associated state, especially when there is 
some perceiver-independent object involved.  
 
Burge does think that touch counts as a genuine perceptual modality. Touch is certainly the most 
“like” vision of the bodily senses. For example, touch uses constancy mechanisms, which Burge 
thinks are necessary part of the objectification process that genuine perception requires.7 Touch 
also allows us to interact with and represent the features of perceiver-independent objects. The 
other bodily modalities, not so much. Touch is the most “like” exteroceptive perception, since it 
is a modality capable of representing content from objects outside of the perceiver. However, it 
does not always represent perceiver-independent information. Tactile perception (particularly the 
sub-modality of cutaneous touch) gives us information about the body as well as perceiver-
 




independent objects. Feeling pressure, for instance, while often caused by some perceiver-
independent surface, represents perceiver-dependent information, such as the feeling of the 
surface in contact with the skin.  
 
It seems like Burge would count touch which represents an exogenous stimulus (haptic touch) as 
genuinely perceptual (like the perception of the shape of a coffee cup), but not endogenous 
tactile stimulation (cutaneous touch--that which originates from/refers to the perceiver’s own 
body). Basically, his view on touch is likely similar to Matthen’s, where Matthen distinguishes 
the genuinely perceptual sub-modality as haptic perception (in distinction from tactile sensation, 
which would be cutaneous touch). We’ll turn to a more detailed discussion of Matthen’s view in 
the proceeding section.  
 
It’s not totally clear how exactly Burge thinks about proprioception. He says that it does exhibit 
some perceptual elements, perhaps because of the frequency of proprioceptive coordination with 
other modalities, and that “a perceptual system need not be autonomously perceptual in all its 
perceptual aspects” (p. 414). This is quite a confusing point, because proprioception does not 
seem to be captured by the characterization of perception Burge gives.8 The most likely 
interpretation of his remarks on proprioception is that proprioceptive input sometimes features in 
genuinely perceptual states but that proprioception alone is not a perceptual modality. Burge also 
admits that pain’s locatedness—a product of coordination with other modalities to represent pain 
according to places on one’s internal body-map—does exhibit some kind of genuine 






itself does not exhibit any genuine representationality. We’ll return to a similar point later on, 
when considering the perceptuality of bodily states in more detail.  
 
Regardless of a clear word on whether proprioception ought to be considered a sensory or 
perceptual system, the fact that it isn’t clear where it ought to fall on Burge’s categorization, sets 
the stage for where we will go in the rest of this paper. Proprioception is a paradigmatic case of a 
bodily faculty muddling the very distinction between sensory and perceptual processes—a 
process which seems to bear many of the hallmarks of perceptuality yet is different enough from 
decidedly perceptual modalities (such as vision) to perhaps warrant some kind of distinction. The 
fact that proprioception seems sort of perceptual yet is characterized as sensory shows that the 
distinction between sensory and perceptual modalities may break down. 
 
For example, Nudds (2012) isolates proprioception as a potential counterexample to Burge’s 
account of the distinction between sensation and perception:  
Bodily awareness - awareness of body position and movement - seems clearly perceptual. 
There are illusions of both body position and movement, and referential illusions 
involving parts of the body, that can only be explained (within Burge's framework) in 
representational terms. The processes that produce representations of body position and 
movement integrate information from sensory receptors in the muscles, joints and skin, 
both locally - to produce representations of the position and movement of body parts - 
and globally - to produce a representation of the whole body. There is no 
underdetermination problem to solve, and so no perceptual constancy mechanisms 
involved in producing these representations of the body (167).  
The point here is that proprioception seems to be intuitively perceptual, bearing some of the 
characteristics of perceptuality given by Burge, but not all. Particularly, proprioception does not 
appear to use constancy mechanisms. Proprioception (or bodily awareness more generally) 
would have to be, on Burge’s account, a representational non-perceptual sensory system—




either proprioception is not perceptual, or Burge’s account of what distinguishes perception from 
sensation is incorrect.9  
 
Burge’s view on all of this certainly makes sense, given how Burge is thinking about perception. 
If you think that perception is necessarily objective, indeed where objectivity begins, you will of 
course think that perception needs to have some objectifying capacity, particularly the same kind 
of objectifying capacity that we apparently see in visual perception. The bodily senses don’t 
seem to have this kind of objectifying capacity, first and foremost, because they do not represent 
external (perceiver-independent) objects, a criterion seemingly needed to objectify (Burge-style) 
in the first place. To objectify, there must be objects, there must be (veridical) representation, 
and there must be constancy mechanisms—all things that Burge thinks are absent from the 
bodily sensory systems (those that detect bodily information).  
 
Of course, Burge references various bodily senses at numerous times through Origins, and what 
is said here is not intended as a fully comprehensive summary to that effect. However, the details 
provided in this section should be sufficient to capture the basic idea of why the relevant bodily 
modalities are considered non-representational sensory systems (and thus not perceptual 
systems) and begin to hint at some of the ways that I will push back against framing bodily sense 
information as non-perceptual.  
 
 
9 Of course, Burge would say that proprioception is not perceptual. However, this would require 
him to explain how it is that bodily information is represented if perception is where 





1.2. Matthen on tactile sensation vs haptic perception  
 
A recent example of a modality distinction view comes from Matthen (2021), in which he seeks 
to distinguish tactile sensation (T) from haptic perception (H). Primarily, this distinction comes 
from the fact that T represents private information about the body; if the object of awareness is 
how something feels to the body, we seem to have a case of T. In contrast, H represents objective 
features of perceiver-independent objects, such as a coffee cup, or a cell phone. I can grasp the 
coffee cup and so can you, for it is an object that exists in public space external to the perceiver 
herself. Because of the private, internal nature of T, and the public, external nature of H, T and H 
are ontologically distinct. T and H are not merely different steps in the same process, or changes 
in perspective.10 T is “phenomenal and immanent”; H is “objective and transcendent.” 
Accordingly, another difference between T and H is that T is non-spatial, while H represents 
spatial information about the objects perceived (and their relationship to the perceiver). The 
examples Matthen uses to initially introduce the distinction are as follows: 
(T) In the darkness of early morning, I reach out to turn my phone-alarm off, and I bump 
against the corner of the table. I feel a sharp thwack on the back of my hand. This is a tactile 
sensation. 
(H) I reach past the edge of the table and grab my phone. I feel it vibrate in my hand. It is 
the phone that I feel vibrating, not my hand. This is haptic perception (Ibid 2).  
 
For Matthen, T also encompasses pressure, temperature, and pain—for these are qualities that 
show up in sensory experience, but are not found in, or representative of, perceiver-independent 
 
10 Recall the discussion of framing sensation and perception as types of systems vs stages in the 
same process. For Reid, sensation was pre-perception. The modality distinction views deny this, 





objects and properties (note: this is not the same as saying such states are not caused by external 
objects).  
 
The issue here is not that we don’t have distinct kinds of experiences in T and H. On that point, 
Matthen is correct. T gives us information about the perceiver herself while H gives us 
information about a perceiver-independent object.11 The issue stems from the characterization of 
T as sensational (not perceptual) and non-spatial. As I will argue, there are grounds for treating 
bodily information bearing states and the systems which produce them (such as those which 
Matthen isolates as sensational, not perceptual) as perceptual, not merely sensory. The bodily 
modalities have more perception-like qualities than may be appreciated by these sorts of 
modality distinction views.  
 
To avoid confusion going further, I’ll refer to T as “cutaneous touch” and H as “haptic touch.” 
This gets at the basic difference, without continuing the distinction based on a sensory/perceptual 
modality distinction. I will also be assuming that the kind of tactile perception Burge refers to is 
haptic touch, for that seems to be the tactile sub-modality most closely associated with constancy 
mechanisms and thus the ability to represent perceiver-independent objects as possessing stable 
features.12 Haptic touch is the most “objectifying” tactile sub-modality, for it requires the active 
 
11 This is similar to the point made in the previous chapter, where I argue that bodily perception 
is necessarily subjective in that it gives us information about the perceiver. However, what’s 
different is that Matthen things perceiver-dependent sensory information is not perceptual, 
because perception requires a perceiver-independent object.  
12 Cutaneous touch is more closely associated with proprioceptive input, and can perceive things 
like pressure and texture, but is not capable of exploring objects like haptic touch, which is 
sometimes referred to as “exploratory touch” to reflect this. While Burge does not specify types 
of touch, it is fair to assume that this is the kind of touch he is most concerned with as it would 




exploration and manipulation of objects distinct from the perceiver. The examples Burge gives of 
tactile perception seem to suggest that haptic touch is what he is referring to, even though he 
does not, to my knowledge, explicitly specify between tactile sub-modalities.  
 
2. Perception without exteroception 
 
A commonality among views distinguishing sensory modalities from perceptual modalities (such 
as Burge’s and Matthen’s) is that they seem to require the representation of a perceiver-
independent stimulus. However, this leaves bodily perception—that which represents 
information about the perceiver’s body—definitively non-perceptual and thus, merely sensory. 
As Matthen writes: “[…] the term ‘perception’ marks awareness of something distinct from the 
subject herself, or her body. The qualities that H presents are attributed to things outside the 
body, in peripersonal space, and not to the experience itself” (Ibid 4). But why is it not possible 
to perceive information from, or parts of, one’s own body?  
 
It is not uncommon to frame perception as the process of objectively representing external 
(perceiver-independent) stimuli. Vision is used as the paradigmatic perceptual faculty, and thus, 
the visual system is taken as representative of how perception works. In vision, we have the 
representation of objects and their properties as they are independent of us. Because perception 
in general is typically modelled from vision specifically, even when the requirement of 
perception involving the representation of perceiver-independent information is not explicitly 
mentioned, it is implied. For Burge, perception requires individuating the object of perception 




(likely because there is no perceiver-independent object to separate from the sensory 
information). As we’ve seen, Matthen assumes something similar in saying that “perception” 
refers to the awareness of something distinct from the subject.  
 
Although there are some similarities between the way the bodily senses are framed (and what 
genuine perception requires), we have two different kinds of characterizations from Matthen and 
Burge. Matthen seems to focus in on the experiential, phenomenal aspect of cutaneous touch, 
suggesting that because the object of awareness is bodily, that what we have is something purely 
psychological without any objective reality. Thus, he seems to suggest that bodily sensation only 
exists in phenomenal experience. For Burge, the opposite is true. He focuses on a very 
mechanistic, behavioristic explanation of bodily sensation such that it follows a kind of stimulus-
response picture (in distinction from the richly psychological picture he paints of vision and 
perception proper). However, neither seem to quite capture the nature of bodily information-
bearing states, or bodily sense experience.  
 
The rest of this paper seeks to counter the type of move made by Burge and Matthen, that which 
frames bodily modalities as sensory, not perceptual, and thus distinguishes sensation and 
perception as types of systems, not as distinct stages in processing. It examines whether 
perception is possible without representing the properties of perceiver-independent objects. And 
thus, whether bodily perception is possible. Specifically, I argue that there are various 
considerations suggesting that bodily sense-information is given in a perceptual way, and that 
framing the bodily modalities as sensory (as distinct from perceptual modalities) misrepresents 





3. Perceiving the body 
 
In bodily perception, that is perception of/through the body, the body itself can be thought of as a 
perceptual object. There are a few considerations which suggest this. The following section looks 
to whether commonly held hallmarks of perceptuality such as representation, veridicality 
conditions, spatiality, and constancy, are features of states bearing bodily sense information.  
For the purposes of this paper, the bodily perception I am concerned with is primarily 
somatosensory perception. I distinguish somatosensory perception from interoception, which is 
the signaling of information from internal processes (organs and metabolic processes). While 
somatosensory perception will be the focus, many claims will also hold for interoception. Given 
constraints of space and in keeping things as simple as possible, I won’t be explicitly considering 
interoception.  
 
What I am mainly concerned with here is whether the body can be thought of as a perceptual 
object, and whether states representing bodily sensory information can be considered perceptual 
states. This is slightly different from talking about whether specific modalities themselves count 
as perceptual, but I take it that the modalities that rely on bodily representation, for their 
localization and presentation such as tactile and proprioceptive systems, would therefore come 
along for the ride. Individual systems/modalities are perceptual in virtue of their coordination 
with the body map, which is part of how the sensory information from specific modalities is 
represented as bodily. Therefore, it is not the sensory modalities themselves but how these 




comes together to create bodily perception. The way I am thinking about this is in line with what 
the term “sensory perception” intuitively means: that sensations occur, and they are perceived by 
the perceptual modalities through being processed/represented by the mind/brain. In this case, 
they are perceived as occurring in particular locations and having a particular experiential 
character. Thus, I am not running together sensation and perception, but showing that there are 
two stages to the perception of bodily information: the sensation, and then the perceptual 
representation which represents the sensory information as occurring in a particular bodily 
location and having a particular phenomenal character.13 Fittingly, we will address the issue of 
representation and bodily perception in the next section.  
 
3.1 Representation & Spatiality 
 
The sensory content given by a particular modality is perceived through its representation on 
one’s internal body-map. This representation gives locatedness and spatiality to the sensory 
content given by specific bodily modalities, which is sensory content of a particular type 
(pressure, pain, heat, etc.). This in turn gives us the experience of feeling pain, pressure, or heat, 
which goes beyond simply a stimulation of sensory receptors and a response to that stimulation. 
Basically, I argue that what is going on with bodily sense-information is more akin to perceptual 
representation than accounts such as Burge’s and Matthen’s suggest. There is a sensory stage 
and a perceptual stage, but that bodily sense-information is surely represented at the perceptual 
stage of processing (if not before).14  
 
13 To be clear, I am not conflating haptic touch and cutaneous touch. I am arguing that there is 
more complexity to cutaneous touch than accounts such as Matthen’s suggest.  
14 Recall, once again, this being one aspect of Reid’s characterization of the relationship between 





Burge, for example, argues that objectification makes possible perceptual representation, and 
even says that there are no cases of genuine (sensory)representation that are not perceptual. 
However, Burge also thinks that we can’t separate objectification from constancy mechanisms 
from representation such that any of them can be individuated as a criterion for perception; they 
are inseparable parts of the same process. That being said, Burge does lay out criteria for 
representationality such that “[a] mental state is representational if it has veridicality conditions 
and is as of entities in a subject matter” (292).  
 
If we follow Burge, establishing the representational nature of bodily states should be enough to 
suggest that such states are indeed perceptual, or at the very least more perceptual than his 
characterization of bodily information as merely sensory and thus definitively non-perceptual. 
The question, now, is whether bodily states satisfy this requirement. Here I present evidence for 
the representationality, veridicality, and spatiality of bodily sensory states. Although technically 
representationality and veridicality are distinct criteria, they work together. Perception is thought 
to be veridical because of its representational nature; the representation of the stimulus is what 
can be correct or incorrect, truthful, or not.  Thus, by showing that the bodily sense modalities do 
represent bodily information (in an explanatorily necessary way), we basically get veridicality 
conditions for free.  
 





Errors of bodily perception—whether induced in experimental contexts or through injury—
demonstrate the representational nature of how bodily information is organized by the mind, for 
they demonstrate the possibility of bodily misrepresentation. For instance, the rubber hand 
illusion shows that we can misrepresent our body-map to include an object which is not actually 
part of our body. Somatoparaphrenia shows that we can misrepresent the extension of our body-
map such that parts of our body (often limbs) are not included in our field of ownership. Eating 
disorders associated with body image disturbances show another way in which bodily 
aspects/qualities can be misrepresented, in this case, bodily size.15 And representation really does 
seem to be explanatorily necessary in these cases. Representation helps us to make sense of these 
phenomena.  
 
Consider phantom limb. Phantom limb occurs when, following limb amputation, individuals 
experience sensory input as if the limb were still present. Often, pain and discomfort (phantom 
limb pain) are experienced as well. Research on phantom limb has led to an increased 
understanding of neural plasticity as well as how the brain constructs the somatotopic 
representation of the body. It is thought that phantom limb comes from the brain failing to 
properly update the body-map to account for the new information—that the body no longer 
features the amputated part (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1998). Phantom limb is also described 
in the literature as a perceptual illusion, rather than a delusion, since individuals with phantom 
limb do not think that their limb is attached. Rather, they just experience the limb perceptuality, 
despite knowing that it is no longer part of the body.  
 
 




Representation explains how illusions like phantom limb are possible. Phantom limb happens 
because the mental representation of one’s body does not reflect the body’s current state. In other 
words, the body map misrepresents the reality of the body as no longer having the relevant part. 
If bodily sense-information was not given or processed representationally, it would likely be hard 
to account for disorders of bodily misrepresentation, such as phantom limb. It seems quite 
intuitive that what is going on in cases such as phantom limb is genuinely representational and 
illustrates the nature of how bodily sense-information is processed through representation on the 
body-map. 
 
Spatial location, shape, size, extension: the body has each of these perceptible features, which, 
when represented by the mind, make the perceiving of particular sensory experiences (such as 
pain or temperature) possible. They also make up the feeling of having a body in the first place. 
Basically, the sensory systems making up bodily perception have to represent (whether on their 
own or in coordination with the body-map) sensory information as occurring in particular bodily 
locations. And the way that this makes the most sense is through a representational format.  
Interestingly, Matthen specifically states that cutaneous touch is non-spatial. But it isn’t clear 
why. While cutaneous touch does not necessarily represent information about perceiver-
independent objects, it surely represents information about the perceiver’s own body, such as the 
location of a particular sensation of pressure.  
 
The issue of veridicality is typically thought of in relation to a perceiver-independent perceptual 
object. To represent an object correctly in vision is to represent that object as it actually is in the 




sometimes have external stimuli, such as tactile perception and pain, they do not necessarily give 
us representations of objects as our visual system would. Tactile perception (specifically what 
Matthen would distinguish as haptic perception) is the most “like” vision in that it can represent 
texture, shape, etc.  
 
Elsewhere I have presented some considerations for the veridicality of bodily representations, 
mainly considering disorders of body size, ownership, and interoceptive accuracy. Therefore, it 
will be worthwhile to consider some novel evidence through experimentally induced tactile 
illusions. 
 
The most robust tactile illusions are illusions of localization, which involve the misperception of 
tactile stimulation (particularly pressure) as either occurring in a location that received no 
stimulation or as moving across the body when the stimulation is occurring at discrete locations 
(Lederman & Jones 2011). Importantly, these are illusions involving cutaneous touch, 
specifically pressure, therefore not involving the manipulation of objects (haptic perception) and 
not really explainable as the representing of objects. As such, they are illusions of the location of 
bodily information. One such example is the Tactile Funneling Illusion (TFI). TFI occurs when 
two points of contact are tactually stimulated but the subject perceives stimulation not at the 
points of contact, but at a phantom location between them. In effect, the simultaneous 
stimulation creates the misperception of contact between the actual points of contact.  
The best explanation for what occurs in illusions such as TFI is a misrepresentation of the 
stimulus location. In fact, optical imaging shows that the illusion produces a single cortical 




representation (Chen, Friedman and Roe 2003). What this shows is that the perceived stimulus 
location, rather than the actual stimulus location, is what is represented by the brain. The 
somatosensory representation of the body is just that—a representation of the perceived body, 
rather than something which directly correlates to sensory stimulation. Clearly, there appears to 
be more going on in such cases than a simple correlation between stimulus and response.  
Illusions such as TFI show not only evidence for the representational status of bodily states, but 
also that through representation, bodily information can be represented correctly or incorrectly. 
Most of the time, our tactile representations match the bodily locations where tactile stimulation 
occurs. However, it is possible for these representations not to match the stimulus location. Thus, 
spatial veridicality seems to be attributable to states representing bodily sensory information.  
TFI also causes problems for Matthen’s characterization of cutaneous touch as non-spatial. The 
body is a physical object with extension, shape, size, etc. To think that cutaneous touch does not 
represent spatial information seems to imply a dualistic conception of the body vs perceiver-
independent objects, such that the perceived locations of bodily feelings are not represented as 
occurring in physical space. But this does not seem right. The way that bodily sensations feel is 
very much spatially located. The fact that I can feel a pain in the tip of my toe means that my 
perception of this information represents it as of that specific location. Basically, perceiver-
independent objects are not the only things with spatial dimensions; the body is a spatial object 
as well.  
 





Constancy mechanisms such as those responsible for shape or colour constancy in visual 
perception are often considered as hallmarks of perceptuality. Relatedly, objectification—the 
process in which a perceptual system distinguishes necessary aspects of sensory information 
which make a representation of an object—is more particular to Burge’s specific characterization 
of perception (or at least is first conceptualized by Burge). Burge’s conception of perceptual 
constancy thus seems to be more like an objectual constancy: it is the employment of constancy 
capacities to objectify in perception.  
 
Burge’s understanding of objectual constancies is not necessarily the norm, as constancy 
capacities don’t necessarily objectify. However, Burge’s account of what objectification is and 
its role in defining perception shows a very familiar way of thinking about perception as 
necessarily the representation of perceiver-independent objects. This is evident as well in 
Matthen’s account of the haptic/tactile distinction: haptic perception is perceptual because of its 
representation of perceiver-independent objects and properties. Because both constancy and 
objectification come most strongly from visual perception, they are criteria which don’t 
necessarily apply to the bodily modalities. This could lead us in a few different, possible 
directions: we could say that 1) the bodily modalities are not perceptual because they do not use 
constancy mechanisms or partake in objectification, that 2) that constancy and objectification are 
not in fact necessary for perception, or 3), the view I will present here, that the bodily modalities 
engage in a different kind of objectification—what I call “subjective objectification.”  
While constancy mechanisms and objectification as they are laid out as part of visual perception, 




processes at work.16 Basically, I argue that bodily perception makes use of similar—though not 
identical—capacities. Because bodily perception detects and represents information about the 
perceiver (subjective information), the kinds of capacities representing the body as a perceptual 
object will be a bit different than those used to represent perceiver-independent objects. And it 
makes sense that, given the nature of the bodily senses as detecting information about the 
perceiver, that they wouldn’t work in exactly the same way as modalities which primarily detect 
information which is not about the perceiver. Next, I consider some aspects of bodily perception 
that suggest something kind of like objectification is at work.  
 
For instance, there is likely some promise in considering whether the maintenance of the 
somatotopic body map in the mind (that which gives localization and structure to somatosensory 
perception) is kind of like—if not exactly—a type of perceptual objectification. Consider the 
case of phantom limb. Phantom limb suggests that, our body’s representation can extend 
spatially even when a part of the stimulus is removed. This suggests an explanation for the 
illusion in which the body-map17 does not get updated to reflect the new state of the body in 
which the missing limb is no longer attached. Plausibly, the same sort of thing could explain 
illusions which add objects to the body map, such as the rubber hand illusion. It also uses tactile 
information in coordination with proprioceptive and visual information to maintain the veridical 
bodily representation through correctly dictating the bounds of the body.  
 
16 Tactile perception being the obvious exception here. There are constancy mechanisms 
employed in tactile perception, such as the capacity for texture constancy.  
17 Following de Vignemont (2017) I use “body-map” to refer to the relatively stable 
somatosensory representation of the body in the mind/brain but could also be referred to as 
“long-term body image” (O’Shaughnessy 1980). The body schema is thought to be different 




The individual body-map thus can be construed as engaging in a kind of bodily objectification. 
Regardless of differing input, such as information from the proprioceptive/kinesthetic system 
about movement/position changes, or itches, tickles, pains, and pressure, it preserves bodily 
shape and dimension as a constant perceptual backdrop for sensory changes to be represented 
against. This point follows O’Shaughnessy (1980). Thanks to our body map (what he refers to as 
“long-term body image”) bodily sensations are experienced in this spatial frame, as what he calls 
“sensations-at-a-part-of-body-in-relative-space.” 
 
It is thus the body map which structures the subjective sensations of the body. Briscoe (2019) 
explains this point well with the example of proprioception: 
This stored, relatively stable representation of the subject’s anatomy enriches and 
imposes spatial order on information provided by proprioceptive receptor systems […] 
The body-map thus provides information about bodily metrics needed for purposes of 
locating bodily parts in space and performing object-directed actions (p. 12).  
 
It may seem strange to call what the body-map in coordination with sensory input from various 
modalities does objectification, because they primarily perceive subjective information 
(information about the perceiver). However, as we know, this is not necessarily at odds with that 
information being from an objective source, for instance, some physiological condition of the 
body. However, once we get over the fact that subjective perception is not necessarily the 
perception of things which don’t really exist or exist only in the perceiver’s mind, it isn’t so 
strange to think that the bodily modalities can represent subjective information that is also 
objective.18 After all, the way that Burge uses objectification is really something like “to be 
 
18 See previous chapter, “more than a feeling,” for an in-depth discussion of bodily perception as 
necessarily subjective perception. Here I explain the particular use of “subjective” which is not 
actually at odds with using “objective” defined as “of or as an object.” A subject can also be an 




represented as an object.” And this involves discrimination capacities capable of individuating 
what aspects of the perceptual field belong to what.  
 
The discriminative capacity (or something sufficiently similar) that defines objectification 
certainly exists in bodily perception. To be able to detect when a particular sensation occurs on 
the body requires individuating the previous state from the current state. In addition, it requires a 
pre-reflective representation of bodily location as well as type of sensory stimulation. An itch, 
for instance, does not require conscious or active reflection of it as an itch, nor conscious or 
active reflection of where it is located. Still, the character of an itch is immediately recognizable, 
perhaps especially due to the change from more of neutral feeling to an itchy feeling. We can 
also (unreflectively, I think) perceive that one part of the body is itchy while another is not. The 
same goes for pain. When we feel pain, in most typical cases, we can distinguish the location of 
the pain from the rest of our bodily sensations. Pain does not apply to the whole body. It is 
generally localized. While perhaps not exactly the same as objectification in Burge’s sense, there 
seems to be something similar in terms of discrimination/identification going on. A particular 
itch, pain, or feeling of pressure, requires an automatic discrimination of the particular sensory 
information from the rest of the bodily input. And that discrimination requires the representation 
of that information as having an intensity, a sensory character, and a location. All of this is 
possible because the sensory content of a given modality is given—perceived—as bodily, as 
happening to one’s body. And that likely occurs as part of a genuinely perceptual process.  
Another component of bodily perception, that illuminates bodily objectification, is the 
phenomenon of bodily ownership. Bodily sensations such as pain and touch are given and 




“normal” circumstances, be divorced from this sense of ownership. They have a domain, 
specifically because of the bodily bounds that dictate the field of ownership. de Vignemont, in 
her account of the role of touch in creating the felt sense of ownership, explains how bodily 
ownership requires a sort of objectification of the body: 
Imagine that you have a cross on a map indicating "you are here," but the map is completely 
blank: there is no reference point, no orientation, no border. The cross is then of little interest. 
It is only when you put a tracing paper with all the information drawn on it over the blank 
map that you can know where you are. Likewise, tactile experiences need to be structured by 
the awareness of bodily boundaries. Tactile sensations are experienced as being located on 
the background of what may be conceived as a map of the body, that is, a representation of 
the enduring properties of the body, including the structural organization of its various parts 
independently of current bodily posture (2017 p. 466-7).  
 
What de Vignemont describes here is very much in line with my claim that, in bodily perception, 
the body is made a perceptual object. Specifically, she describes the sense in which the body is 
represented as a bounded object within a larger space, the world outside of the perceiver. In order 
for the body to make sense within the larger context that is the world we inhabit it has to be 
differentiated from it. And to be differentiated from it, it must be considered as something in the 
first place. The body is special sort of object, because it is part of the subjective self, but it is a 
perceptual object nonetheless. What the quote from de Vignemont explains is the role that this 
sort of objectification—the objectification of the body—plays in our subjective experience. This 
sort of objectification makes possible the experience of body ownership, for ownership requires a 
drawing of boundaries between what is bodily and what is not.  
 
This consideration of body ownership also works to further develop the claim that bodily 
information is represented spatially. Recall, Matthen asserts that cutaneous touch (T, as he calls 
it) is distinguished from haptic touch because it lacks spatiality. According to de Vignemont, 




represented as such. For de Vignemont, ownership is defined partially through spatial 
considerations.19 What is inside the bounds of the body—the bounds dictated primarily by the 
tactile sense—is then inside the field of ownership. That which is outside the body is outside the 
field of ownership.  
 
To recap: I have argued in this section that there is a type of objectification unique to bodily 
perception. Specifically, subjective objectification. This type of objectification occurs when the 
body is represented as an object. The body is a special kind of object because it is part of our 
subjective self, but it bears the qualities of an object in the way it exists within and beyond our 
experience of it. We experience it as spatially located, shaped, bounded, and as owned. We also 
experience sensations as occurring to it at particular locations.  
 
3.3. Perceptual constancy  
 
But what about perceptual constancy? For Burge, objectification occurs through constancy. As 
we’ve said, Burge’s conception of constancy is the representing of an object as stable despite 
unstable perceptual input. Thus, we should address the issue of constancy before proceeding. 
One possibility may be that the Burgean way of understanding constancy doesn’t easily apply to 
the body.20 If constancy mechanisms function to represent variant properties as invariant or 
stable, that means their function is to preserve the perceiver-independentness of the stimulus. In 
 
19 I say “partially” because de Vignemont also isolates pain as giving necessary valence to bodily 
sensations which contributes to body ownership.  
20 As Buccella (2020) points out, many philosophical understandings of constancy identify it as 
basically the ability to represent variant properties as invariant. This presents a very limited and 





other words, to abstract away from peculiarities in how perceptual information is processed by 
the perceiver. Obviously, if we are talking about bodily perception, there is no perceiver-
independent information to preserve. While we might think that something similar to 
objectification takes place, it is of course going to look different for the perception of perceiver-
independent information. So, this is not to say that the bodily modalities don’t use some kind of 
constancy, but if they do, it wouldn’t be the same kind of thing as we are talking about for the 
perception of perceiver-independent objects. Perceptual constancy is the capacity to represent 
unstable properties of a stimulus as stable. Maybe this happens in bodily perception, but because 
there is no stable object outside of the perceiver to model the representation after, it seems like it 
might be hard to figure out. Regardless, this could be a very interesting area for further research.  
There is, however, experimental evidence for constancy mechanisms at work in tactile 
perception. For instance, the tactile system maintains texture as constant, such as roughness 
constancy (Yoshioka et al. 2011). For example, the perception of the roughness of a brick is 
maintained even when the velocity of touch is changed (it is touched slowly versus quickly). 
This is thought to be the product of cutaneous and proprioceptive input, because roughness 
constancy does not maintain during passive touch, that is when the hand stays still and the object 
is moved across it. Interestingly, constancy is observed during “pseudo-passive touch” where an 
experimenter moves the subject’s hand across the brick, rather than moving it themselves. But 
here we have the instance of a bodily modality interacting with a perceiver-independent stimulus. 
It would seem, then, that the common understanding of perceptual constancy may not 
straightforwardly apply to modalities representing perceiver-dependent information. I don’t take 
this to be a problem, however, because different kinds of stimuli (perceiver-independent vs 




and representing of perceiver-independent information to work in exactly the same way as that of 
perceiver-dependent information would be a mistake.  
 
While less explored empirically than visual constancy, kinesthetic and proprioceptive constancy 
have empirical reality; researchers studying these modalities talk about and measure perceptual 
constancy in a way that suggests it is not, as Burge might suggest, impossible.21 As Jones (2003) 
writes, 
Under some conditions, the proprioceptive system appears to adopt a principle of 
constancy as shown by the ability to use different limb segments and muscles to perform 
a task depending on its requirements (e.g., lift an object with the hand or using the whole 
arm), without any perceptible change in object properties. Interactions with the 
environment would be much more difficult if this were not the case, as the perceived 
properties of objects or tools, such as their weight or stiffness, would vary as a function 
of the limb segments and muscles used to interact with them (p. 1988). 
 
Perceptual constancies of the bodily modalities are thus not mythical creatures, but likely just are 
misunderstood by philosophers because bodily perception tends to be misunderstood (if 
understanding is attempted) by philosophers. What we likely have with the case of the bodily 
modalities are different sorts of constancy mechanisms which once again demonstrate that the 
nature of visual perception cannot simply be extended to non-visual perception. The types of 
constancy we see in vision—and the qualities held constant in vision—are likely going to be 
particular to vision, or at the very least not extendable to all perceptual modalities.  
We have thus seen some promise for the existence of perceptual constancies for bodily 
interactions with perceiver-independent objects. Thus, it would seem fair to say perceptual 
constancies are supposed to correct for the subjective element of perception such as a change in 
perspective or distance from an object. If the perception is not of a perceiver-independent 
 




stimulus, there is seemingly nothing to correct. Thus, it seems plausible that constancy capacities 
qua objectification capacities only apply to the perception of perceiver-independent objects, or 
objects distinct from the perceiver herself. That being said, it could be that it just isn’t clear what 
constancy capacities for purely bodily/subjective perception would look like. For instance, some 
kind of pain constancy.  
 
The fact that bodily perception is strongly multimodal could be relevant here as well. The 
phenomenon of roughness constancy previously described is said to require both proprioceptive 
and cutaneous input. While we don’t have straightforward cases of constancy mechanisms in all 
cases of bodily perception, this shouldn’t really be a problem for a few reasons. First, there is 
some measure of perceptual constancy in the perception of some qualities by the bodily senses 
(specifically, in the perception of texture). Second, constancy capacities do not seem necessary 
for bodily/subjective objectification. We have shown thus far that the bodily senses represent 
information in a perceptual way without using constancy capacities, or at least without evidence 
of their use.  
 
Before switching course, consider another possible route for understanding whether/how 
perceptual constancy capacities are used by the bodily modalities. The Burgean understanding of 
constancy is that it exists to preserve the nature of perceiver-independent objects in the face of 
invariance and underdetermination.  Call this “objectual constancy.” Perhaps objectual constancy 
is just one type of constancy.22 Consider categorical perception—the ability to categorize 
perceptual qualities as the same (or different) across distinct objects or perceptual states. In order 
 
22 Thanks to Jesse Prinz for the term “objectual constancy” and for suggesting the concept of 




to detect these perceptual qualities and apply the concepts of sameness or difference, there needs 
to be some mechanism of categorization. For example, there are different qualities a pain 
experience can have: dullness, stabbing, radiating, variations in intensity, etc. There is likely 
some part of pain perception that can detect these qualities across various distinct instances, and 
categorize distinct experiences of these qualities as being, in some sense, the same. We could call 
this “categorical constancy.” Another example: even being able to categorize distinct experiences 
of pain as the same across time requires this kind of ability. To go to the doctor and say “the pain 
in my shoulder is back” is not just a statement about the location of the pain, although that may 
be an important feature, but also the quality of the pain itself. This could be a very promising 
direction to go in, as it would solve the problem of how to make sense of constancy mechanisms 
in bodily perception, where there are not the same problems of perceptual overdetermination and 
invariant stimuli. Additionally, because categorical perception and thus categorical constancy 
occurs across various types of perception—most prominently visual perception—it serves as a 
further commonality among them. What this shows is that constancy mechanisms may be 
broader than how they are characterized by Burge. While a lot more could be said on this topic, 
its inclusion is intended to demonstrate that there are likely ways of solving the issue of 
perceptual constancy. Thus, it is intended to be a tentative, potential solution to the issue of 
whether the bodily senses beyond tactile perception use constancy mechanisms, not a conclusive 
treatment of the issue.  
 





Now, let’s see whether bodily perception would satisfy the perceptual criteria set out by someone 
with a clear, and strict, conception of perceptuality. For example, Burge defines perception as 
objective sensory representation. As he writes, 
I turn now from general remarks about objectification to further elaboration of the sense 
in which perception is objective sensory representation. Objective sensory representation 
represents what is in fact a mind‐independent, or perspective‐independent, physical 
subject matter as having some of the attributes that it in fact has (2010, 408).  
Is this what we have in cases of bodily perception, particularly the considered examples of pain, 
(cutaneous) touch, proprioception, itch, and temperature? Experiencing an itch, a distinct change 
in temperature, or a pain, certainly seems to be experienced as something mind-independent, as 
“a physical subject matter” that has some particular attributes. What’s more, the body, and the 
sensory receptors and systems responsible for detecting, processing, and representing 
somatosensory information, are (in most cases) detecting physical subject matter; there is a fact 
of the matter as to whether the nociceptive system is stimulated and processing noxious stimuli, 
and this fact of the matter is the result of physical processes. Even in cases where there is a more 
psychological cause, such as psychosomatic itch or chronic pain, there is still some fact of the 
matter as to whether this sensory stimulation is occurring in the brain/body/mind. It is not a 
phantom non-physical event; it has a physiological, thus material and objective, basis.  
In addition, these experiences feel like they are occurring in or to the parts of the body in which 
they are felt. The body and its parts are thus a perceptual object of sorts, certainly having an 
objective and material reality. The phenomenology of an itch represents it as something 
happening to the skin, as something with objective reality, not as something created by the mind. 
These experiences are represented as having mind-independent physical subject matter, even if a 
lot of what is going on is processing by the subject’s own systems (even mental systems). Even if 




“in” the body parts in which they are felt, it should be uncontroversial that such experiences are 
represented to the mind as if they are. And this representation of sensory stimulation as occurring 
to physical parts of the body seems genuinely perceptual in that we feel that there is some 
objective state of affairs being represented to the subject. This representing of bodily information 
as of an object is the basic idea behind subjective objectification.  
Consider the dissociability of the sensory component of bodily perception from the actual 
perception of sensory information. Take pain as a specific example. Pain perception is not 
nociceptive processing. It is pain experience represented as happening to one’s body. The idea 
that pain (or any of the other considered modalities) simply follows the kind of stimuli-response 
pattern that would characterize it as merely sensory is to massively misunderstand and 
mischaracterize the psychological and physiological complexity of bodily perception.  
 
An issue that might arise in response to the characterization of the body-map as a kind of 
objectification is that it does not illustrate the world-to-mind flow of information that might be 
required for perception. It is a representation in the mind/brain which then gives structure to 
incoming sensory input. This is potentially quite different from perceiving a coffee cup or a 
pencil as an object. My response to this is that, despite the intuition that the two cases are 
different, they aren’t really. The body is a mind-independent object and although it is a special 
one at that, given its intimate connection to the mind/brain, mental representations of the body 
are still representations of a mind-independent object.  
 
The bodily sensory systems probably do not work in the exact same way as visual and auditory 




enough to show that the bodily senses are quite more like those modalities than mere stimuli-
response systems. And thus, not only are bodily systems not merely sensory systems (on a 
modality distinction-type view), a modality distinction type view looks untenable. A 
paradigmatic example of sensory registration for vision is retinal registering. Another example is 
taxis—the stimuli-response engaged in by single-celled organisms. Given what we have 
considered thus far, it should seem implausible that bodily information given through the bodily 
senses and represented as occurring to our subjective bodies is more like these alleged sensory 
occurrences than genuinely perceptual ones.  
 
So far I’ve been suggesting that the bodily modalities have sufficient similarities to visual 
perception. Thus, in some sense, bodily systems are the same kind of thing as visual systems. 
However, I’ve been careful not to claim that bodily perception is exactly the same kind of thing 
as visual perception. There are some similarities, to be sure, enough to suggest that it is 
perceptual in some sense, but maybe not perceptual enough according to many understandings of 
perceptuality as based on the nature of visual perception. One reason for going in this direction is 
that I anticipate pushback against considering bodily perception as necessarily the same as a 
modality like vision. Another reason is that there are, as we have seen, relevant differences and 
similarities between the bodily modalities and characterizations of perception as based on visual 
perception. The view I propose next allows us to accommodate all of this. This view does not 
commit us to holding that all modalities with perceptual features are the same kind of thing. 
Also, it does not require us to mark a strict distinction between sensation and perception.  
 





The way that the perception is framed by modality distinction views, it is an on-or-off kind of 
thing. Either a system or a state is perceptual, or it isn’t. Burge, for instance, specifically writes 
that the sensory-perceptual system kind needs to be sharply distinguished from the sensory 
system kind. However, the considerations thus far may cast doubt on the idea that perceptuality 
is an all or nothing kind of thing. As we’ve seen, states bearing bodily sense-information have 
many qualities in common with genuine perceptual states on even a strict conception of 
perceptuality such as Burge’s. This might be enough to call it a day and conclude that such 
bodily states, and the systems responsible for such states, are perceptual, even though they seem 
to work differently and perceive different kinds of information. But we can also explore an 
alternative: degrees of perceptuality.  
 
Burge considers this type of view as part of what he calls the “deflationary tradition”—intended 
to pick out a school of thought wherein the distinctive representational kind he claims to identify 
is deflated.23 Representation, he thinks, does not come in degrees. It is a distinctive psychological 
kind that picks out a type of naturally occurring phenomenon.  
 
First, there is an issue here with Burge running together the use of degrees of representation with 
applying representation to things which he thinks are not actually representational. For instance, 
he thinks that people who use the degrees of representation talk use it to apply representation to 
things like thermometers and amoebas, therefore perverting this distinctly psychological concept. 
If representation is a distinctly psychological concept, things like thermometers and amoebas 
 




will not have it. However, this does not mean that it can’t show up in other areas, such as in the 
mental presentation of bodily sense information. And since representation is part of perception, 
but alone is not sufficient for it, maybe there can be representational sensory states which, while 
not completely cohering to the visual picture, are still somewhat perceptual. In other words, if 
representation applies to sensory states that are not, for various reasons, considered perceptual, 
this suggests that we have more of a representationality spectrum or perceptuality spectrum than 
Burge would allow.  
 
Second, maybe there are many distinct kinds which all possess some degree of 
representationality. For instance, could there not be some intermediate kind between 
representation and registration that would not assume that everything from thermometers to 
amoebas represent. Burge states that representation is distinctly psychological, and the kind of 
thing discussed in this paper demonstrates that perceiving the body is a very psychological act.  
There thus may be some promise, given the considerations presented in this paper, in considering 
a gradient view of perceptuality. A similar kind of thing has been discussed concerning cognition 
and consciousness (Godfrey-Smith 2016, 2020), suggesting that the origins of consciousness and 
cognition are found in different degrees throughout a variety of life forms. This sort of proposal 
takes phenomena which some philosophers have framed as highly complex, mysterious, 
uniquely human, and all-or-nothing, and located their evolutionary origins in non-humans. This 
is not to say, of course, that human cognition or human consciousness is found in non-humans, 






The specific kind of view I have in mind, proposed by Godfrey-Smith (2020), is a gradualist 
view of minds and experience. He bases this view from biological, evolutionary considerations, 
which suggest that consciousness (or subjective experience, to use a perhaps less loaded term), 
didn’t just jump into existence, but came slowly (gradually) into view: 
New language waits to be developed here, but the picture I endorse is something like this. 
In humans, there just is felt experience. But as we move toward cases with less and less 
of what is present in us, subjectivity grades or fades away. In some other animals, ‘Is it 
conscious?’ or ‘Does it have experience?” does not have a yes-or-no answer; instead, the 
goings-on inside an animal can be more or less experiential (207).  
 
 
While the focus of this paper has been perception, sensation, and the body, and not 
consciousness per se, the two are undoubtedly related. Even without any relation, the basic 
gradualist framework is what’s really important. And thus, the general idea Godfrey-Smith 
brings forth here, may be helpful in thinking through the idea that perceptuality may exist on a 
spectrum. Like consciousness, philosophers tend to talk about perceptuality as an all-or-nothing 
phenomenon. Like consciousness, perception is special and somewhat miraculous. It also seems 
tempting for some to therefore frame perception (like consciousness) as something rare and 
uniquely possessed by only the most complex of organisms. But this might be the wrong 
approach.  
 
While the nature of animal sensory systems or other organisms is not being considered, the basic 
idea behind a gradual approach can be applied to human perception. What we’ve seen in the case 
of the bodily senses suggests that perception as a category is perhaps less cut-and-dry than some 
philosophers have previously thought. The bodily senses, while not being identical with 





Therefore, rather than framing perceptuality and sensationality as binary opposing phenomena, 
maybe we ought to think of them as existing on a spectrum. What the considerations in this paper 
show is that the qualities defining perceptuality on some philosophical accounts apply more 
broadly—and less straightforwardly—than their authors may have intended. A gradualist sort of 
account would allow us to maintain that vision is a robust and defining perceptual phenomenon, 
with immense complexity and intelligence, without discounting the similarities of bodily 
systems. On this view, vision, olfaction, proprioception, and things like chemotaxis exist on a 
spectrum, rather than being fundamentally different in kind. More primitive forms of sensation 
could therefore be proto-perceptual, or partially perceptual, with bodily systems existing not 
entirely distinct from modalities like vision, thus somewhere close to vision on the perceptual 
spectrum, but slightly closer to the more “primitive” end. This sort of view could also have 
promise for thinking about the perceptual capacities of all sorts of living organisms, although I 
won’t be addressing that here.  
 
A consequence of this kind of view is that it would allow different bodily modalities to be more-
or-less perceptual. Maybe tactile perception, in the way it senses both perceiver dependent and 
independent properties, is closer to vision on the spectrum than, say, pain. But because both 
tactile perception and pain have perceptualistic features, they are both perceptual somewhat, to 







A final word before concluding: the idea of a perceptual spectrum is supposed to help make 
sense of the considerations presented thus far in this paper together with anticipated 
perspectives/intuitions on how to think about and define perception. One may want to say that 
the bodily senses are just as perceptual as modalities like vision and audition, and that there is no 
need for a spectrum. I find this unlikely—but not impossible. For now, the idea of a gradualist 
approach is intended as a tentative option to satisfy my view that there is such a thing as bodily 
perception, with the intuition that there is something distinguishing it from vision, audition, and 
perceiver-independent perception (those that have tended to define perception philosophically) as 
a category.  
 
If one thinks that for some modality or state to be perceptual, it has to be exactly like vision, then 
one will probably not want to say that the bodily modalities or bodily states are properly 
perceptual. Thus, a gradualist view might be attractive in accommodating this sort of view. If one 
does not have such a strict idea about what counts something as perceptual, you might not need 
to entertain a gradualist-type view, although it could be appealing for other reasons. Basically, 
this is an attempt to appease the various sides—those that might have a strict conception of what 
constitutes perceptuality and those that might not. Many philosophers think of vision as defining 
perception as a category—and thus have a narrow view of what actually counts as perception 
(Burge and Matthen are two familiar examples of this). There may also be reluctance to consider 
what I am calling bodily perception as in the same ontological category as vision because of the 
fact that the representational structure of bodily experience comes from the pre-existing body-
map. This is a sort of confluence of top-down and bottom-up information, that is certainly 




consider perceptual in a strict sense. Once again, this is all very tentative, but just speaks to the 
potential reasons for wanting to distinguish bodily perception from properly perceptual processes 
like vision and audition, and thus, why I have been cautious in leaving open the extent to which 
bodily perception is the same kind of thing as vision.  
 
In conclusion, this paper has given considerations for the bodily modalities as perceptual, but 
perhaps still sufficiently different from modalities like vision and audition. I’ve argued that the 
modality distinction views—specifically in how they characterize bodily information as sensory 
and not perceptual—are incorrect. Although the bodily modalities seem to look slightly different 
from uncontroversially perceptual modalities like vision and audition, they still give us 
perceptual-ish representations, and have perceptualistic features such as representationality, 
veridicality, and spatiality. Further, I’ve shown modality distinction views in general to be 
problematic, suggesting instead that perception and sensation are better characterized as stages in 
the same process rather than kinds of modalities. Before concluding, I proposed a gradualist view 
of perception, suggesting that maybe perceptuality and sensationality, as steps in one process, 
exist on a spectrum. Accordingly, some modalities may be further in the perceptual direction 






Somatosensory perception and the perception/cognition border 
 
Introduction 
It is generally accepted that perception and cognition differ in their respective phenomenology. 
Going further, many argue that perception and cognition are distinct kinds of processes. 
However, not everyone agrees that there exists a border between these faculties, and if there is 
one, what characterizes it. Among pro-border theorists, there is disagreement about how it is 
realized by the mind. Despite theoretical differences, a commonality among these views is that 
they are all based on exteroceptive (externally-sensing) perception—particularly vision and 
audition. Claims about the nature of perception in general are commonly made from claims 
about vision specifically. However, it is not always clear that claims about vision can extend to 
capture the nature of non-visual faculties—in particular, the bodily ones. This perhaps explains 
why, as this paper will show, no extant border theory seems able to accommodate somatosensory 
perception (the phenomenon composed of proprioception, thermoception, pain, and touch). For 
example, one popular theory of the perception/cognition border—the architectural view—holds 
that perception is modular, while cognition is not. However, I argue that somatosensory 
perception is not modular since multiple somatosensory faculties violate the criterion of 
informational encapsulation. After giving counterexamples to the architectural view, I go on to 
consider whether competing theories on the nature of the perception/cognition border offer 
resources to accommodate somatosensory perception as a type of perception that is distinct from 




distinguish somatosensory perception—and thus, perception in general—from cognition. Finally, 
I briefly introduce a potential alternative: a functional border between perception and cognition.  
 
1. The perception/cognition border  
 
The question of whether there is a perception/cognition border, and how it is drawn, is important 
for a host of issues regarding the nature of the relationship between cognition and perception. For 
example, whether perception is influenced by subjective factors such as beliefs, desires, mood, 
etc., matters for whether we can take perception to give an accurate, or objective, view of how 
things are. Thus, the nature of the perception/cognition border bears on issues such as whether 
beliefs based on perceptual experience are justified, and whether observation is value laden. 
 
In Modularity of Mind, Jerry Fodor argues that the mind is composed of modules—innate 
structures which organize faculties by their operations. Modules have defining architectural 
characteristics, which constrain their functionality. In particular, the criterion of informational 
encapsulation requires that perception relies on proprietary information that is only accessible for 
use by that module. As such, perception is thought to be a primarily bottom-up phenomenon; in 
perception, the flow of information goes from world to mind. This means that early-level 
perceptual processing is cut-off from cognition. Cognitive information (at least in the short-term) 
cannot influence lower-level perceptual processing. 
 
The issue of cognitive penetration (Pylyshyn 1999) concerns whether perception (in this 




incompatible with modularity, particularly the criterion of information encapsulation. While the 
cognitive impenetrability of perception was implicit in the Fodorian picture, the term “cognitive 
penetration” has been given to the contested phenomena of beliefs, desires, mood, etc, being able 
to influence what we perceive. The issue of cognitive im/penetrability has gained much attention 
in recent years, with a host of studies which purported to show that extra-perceptual content 
(beliefs, for example) influence visual perception (One well-known example is Proffitt et al. 
2003). However, these studies have been met with criticism from proponents of modularity 
(Firestone & Scholl 2016).1 While the relationship between cognition and vision has been the 
main subject of these debates, the relationship between cognition and other perceptual faculties 
has been given insufficient attention.  
 
For either penetrability or impenetrability, there must be a separation of some kind between 
cognition and perception. Without some way to mark the distinction between cognition and 
perception, the question of whether cognition can and does penetrate perception seems to be 
meaningless. However, as we shall see, anti-border theorists seem to think that they are 
accommodating interactions between cognitive and perceptual information by eliminating any 
meaningful distinction between them. In other words, anti-border theorists tend to be pro-
penetration. Conversely, those with strong articulations on the nature of the border, such as 
modularity theorists, generally take the anti-penetration perspective.  
 
 
1 Claims about the possibility of cognitive penetration are interesting. Pro-penetration people are 
bringing together various areas in their work, such as social psychology, ethics, philosophy, 
cognitive science, etc. So, I understand there being something appealing about the possibility that 
subjective social factors influence perception. Perhaps it feels like perception (vision) is 
cognitively penetrable. Or, perhaps it is appealing to those of us who view strong objectivism as 




The distinctions (if any) between bodily perception and cognition have been given insufficient 
philosophical attention. As this paper shows, the nature of the bodily faculties demonstrates the 
need for theories of perception (in this case, theories of what separates perception from 
cognition) to consider perception as a more general phenomenon, or at least clarify their domain 
as applying to specific faculties. A commonality among the border views, which we will turn to 
momentarily, is that they are all primarily based on vision, with some extension to audition, 
particularly language processing. This visuocentrism is quite common in philosophical work on 
perception, although the issue is becoming more commonly addressed by philosophers who 
acknowledge the existence of perceptual faculties other than vision. Indeed, it has been argued 
that there are relevant differences between faculties such as vision and audition, even though 
they may tend to lend themselves to the same kinds of theoretical explanations.2 “Vision” is not 
synonymous with “perception,” although commonly treated as such.  
 
1.1 The Architectural view 
 
Architectural theorists, in the Fodorian vein, hold that perception is informationally encapsulated 
from cognition.3 Perceptual modules have access to incoming information as well as their own 
proprietary information stores. Cognition has no such informational restrictions. Thus, 
perception and cognition have distinct kinds of machinery, which means they work in different 
ways. For architectural theorists, cognition and perception are fundamentally of different kinds. 
They are both naturally occurring processes but have distinct, defining characteristics. However, 
 
2 For instance, O’Callaghan (2011, 2017) argues that auditory perception and the multisensory 
character of perception in general cannot be explained by a simple extension of theories of 
vision. 




like all pro-border views, architectural theories focus on vision as the main example of 
perception. Unfortunately, as I show, vision is not a satisfactory exemplar. While there may well 
be ample evidentiary support for the modularity of vision, somatosensory perception violates 
information encapsulation. Insofar as perception includes somatosensory perception, then, it 
cannot be modular.  
 
2. Somatosensory perception 
 
Somatosensory perception (SP) is a phenomenon composed of the bodily senses of touch, pain, 
thermoception (temperature detection) and proprioception (body position). SP makes possible 
the representation of sensory information as occurring in particular bodily locations. Thus, SP is 
thought to underlie the multisensory representation responsible for the pre-reflective 
understanding/feeling of our body as ours. For example, the sensory component of pain requires 
tactile and proprioceptive systems, in coordination with the body-map, to be represented as a 
pain in a particular bodily location, such as the outside of my left foot, and that that pain is not 
just in a foot, but in my foot.4 
 
Arguably, somatosensory perception is genuinely perceptual.5 Despite its differences from 
perceptual faculties of vision and audition, there are sufficient similarities. As such, it is relevant 
 
4 The “body-map” sometimes called “long body image” refers to the representation of the body 
in the mind/brain. While sensory information seems to be able to make long-term modifications 
to the body-map, it is generally quite stable.  
5 I go over the perceptuality of the bodily senses in more depth in previous chapters. Thus, I 




to this debate.6 First, the fine-grained, spatialized nature of somatosensory representation 
corresponds with the nature of exteroceptive faculties such as vision which also produce fine-
grained, spatial representations (Haggard, Iannetti, & Longo 2013). What this means is that 
somatosensory representations represent qualities with spatiality and detail and comparable to 
representations from modalities like vision. The spatialized nature of somatosensory 
representations—their “locatedness”—is due to the presence of somatotopic maps (maps of the 
body in the brain).7 The somatosensory cortices are responsible for the neural representation of 
the primary somatotopic maps, which are disproportionate to the body to reflect the 
sensitivity/discriminative capacity of each part (Catani 2017, Saadon-Grosman, Loewenstein, & 
Arzy 2020). For instance, the lips and hands, as sensitive body parts, would take up more neural 
space than the shin, despite being proportionally smaller in size. Somatotopic representations in 
the brain make possible both the representation and experience of somatosensory information as 
precisely located. The spatial, representational nature of SP suggests that it belongs in the 
perception category, rather than, as some might initially think, the sensory registration category.  
 
Consider the case of visceral pain versus somatic pain. Visceral pain—pain in the viscera—is 
contrasted with somatic pain (the pain that is considered part of somatosensory perception) as 
distinct in perceptual processing and experience. Such a case seems to suggest that pain 
 
6 According to Burge (2010), constancy mechanisms are necessary for genuine perception. 
Without constancy mechanisms, we have a merely sensory capacity and not proper perception. 
Such a stringent criterion ends up casting the chemical senses such as taste and smell as sensory 
and not properly perceptual. This strikes me as unintuitive. I will therefore set this view aside. 
However, it may be of interest to note that tactile perception seems to use constancy 
mechanisms. Tactile is the most exteroceptive of the somatosenses, perhaps highlighting a link 
between constancy mechanisms and exteroception. 
7 The most prominent somatosensory map is also called the “somatosensory homunculus,” due to 




registration/sensation and precisely located pain are different types of things. One requires 
somatosensory representation to locate the pain in a given body part; visceral pain, in contrast, is 
the kind of diffuse experience that does not require a strong somatosensory representation. 
Consider the case of abdominal pain versus the pain from a paper cut. A paper cut has precise 
localization. At least initially, it does not feel like pain in the general area of the cut, such as a 
pain in the entire finger, but pain at the specific site of damage. Abdominal pain, perhaps from 
indigestion, is an example of visceral pain. While you know the general area that the pain is 
experienced in, it lacks the specification and precision felt in cases of somatic pain. Indeed, 
somatosensory pain and visceral pain are primarily represented in different somatosensory 
cortices (Hobson & Aziz 2003). The primary somatosensory cortex, where somatosensory pain is 
processed and represented, is the area most strongly associated with the somatosensory 
homunculus (the primary somatotopic map). In contrast, visceral pain is primarily represented in 
the second somatosensory cortex, which has relatively poor somatosensory representation. Thus, 
somatosensory representation in the brain is thought to be necessary for the localized nature of 
SP. Without it, we have a more diffuse, less precise experience, which we still feel, but is lacking 
in detail and spatial representation and thus localization.  
 
Second, representation is just as explanatorily necessary for SP as it is for visual perception. This 
means that rather than simply being able to describe SP in representational terms, SP in fact 
requires it. Rather than a sensitivity to physiological disturbance, as interoception (the perception 
of internal signals from viscera) seems to detect, SP seems to represent the body as a perceptual 
object in a similar way to how my visual system represents my coffee cup as a perceptual object. 




think of the sensory content of a particular somatosensory state, say, the feeling of pain as 
located in a particular bodily location, as being like features or qualities of the perceptual object 
(like the colour and texture of my coffee cup, for instance). SP therefore has a relatively static 
object (the body itself), which moves and changes orientation, and features different types of 
sensory input. But what we have appears to be genuinely representational, for there is more than 
just informational registration going on.8  
 
A third indication that SP is in fact perceptual and not just sensory is the fact that somatosensory 
representations can be correct or incorrect. As proprioceptive illusions such as the rubber hand 
illusion demonstrates, we can create an incorrect extension of our body-map to include external 
objects. As phantom pain experiences demonstrate, we can have hallucinatory pain and 
proprioceptive experiences which represent pains in limbs which do not exist. These three 
considerations provide solid ground for treating SP as properly perceptual.9   
3. The architectural view and somatosensory perception 
3.1 The top-down modulation of pain 
 
 
8 It could likely be argued that stability/constancy of one’s bodily representation counts as a kind 
of perceptual constancy mechanism (such as colour constancy in visual perception). However, 
the development of such would require more space than this paper allows.  
9Typically, the bodily faculties (particularly those do not receive external stimuli) have been 
thought of as cases of sensory registration, e.g., see Burge 2010 and Matthen (forthcoming). 
However, the representational nature of somatosensory perception suggests more similarity to 
uncontroversially perceptual faculties than typically thought. While an in-depth discussion of the 
perceptuality of the bodily faculties is needed (and currently underway), it should be plausible 





Pain’s susceptibility to top-down modulation has been well-studied empirically and is now 
garnering philosophical attention. As has been recently argued by both Gilgarov (2017) and 
Shevlin and Friesen (2020), top-down information seems to characteristically influence the 
sensory component of pain.10 One illustrative example suggests that pain experience is 
influenced by positive, empathetic feedback, such as encouraging or supportive comments made 
by an experimenter. In one such recent study by Fauchon et al. (2019), both participant ratings of 
pain intensity and the activation of brain regions associated with pain control suggest that 
receiving empathetic feedback, in contrast to neutral feedback, or unempathetic (negative) 
feedback, lessened the experience of experimental pain intensity. Both patient reports, as well as 
MRI data showing decreased activation in known pain networks under empathetic conditions, 
show that receiving positive feedback can lessen the experience of noxious stimuli. It is 
hypothesized that this is due to empathetic feedback stimulating brain regions associated with 
affective-cognitive processing (specifically autobiographical memory and self-awareness), which 
enables the modulation of pain experience (Ibid). We can think of this as 
environmental/interpersonal influence playing a big part in how we experience and thus tolerate 
pain. If someone is being nice to us (in this case with positive, verbal interactions) in the 
presence of a noxious stimulus, we will in effect feel less pain.11 This speaks to the top-down 
 
10 Shevlin and Friesen are careful not to say that pain is perceptual in the way that vision is 
perceptual, but that top-down factors affect pain sensation. They also specifically discuss the 
phenomenon of placebo analgesia.  
11 There is a great deal of work suggesting that this is true. Pain catastrophizing and the 
anticipation of pain have both been shown to modulate (in this case, increase) pain experience 
(Sullivan et al. 2001; Gracely et al. 2004; Seminowicz & Davis 2006). This makes sense, as 
anyone who has dealt with the anticipation of a painful experience might know. Trying to remain 
calm about the experience helps with the ability to tolerate it (if you succeed in being calm, 
rather than getting more worked up about how you should be feeling calm). Individuals who 





modulation of pain by extra-perceptual factors as just part and parcel of pain experience. 
Psychological factors such as distraction and expectation have also been shown to drastically 
influence the intensity of one’s pain through the cognitive manipulation of one’s pain control 
network (Wiech 2016).  
 
An extensive body of work by James Gross and his lab has documented that different regulation 
strategies—emotional suppression versus emotional reappraisal—have drastically different 
effects on our psychophysiology (Braams, B.R., Blechert, J., Boden, M.T., & Gross, J.J. (2012); 
Gross, J.J. (2014); Ghafur, R.D., Suri, G., & Gross, J.J. (2018)). For example, attending to the 
specific phenomenology caused by an undesirable stimulus versus attempting to suppress the 
phenomenology from an undesirable stimulus will have drastically different effects on our 
experience of it. Attending to the specific phenomenology of the stimulus lessens the undesirable 
experience (for example, disgust), while trying to suppress it or get rid of it, exaggerates the 
problem. This is applicable to pain because pain and emotion are similar, or even intertwined. 
Both have affective and sensory/physiological components. Additionally, it is reasonable to 
suspect that a big part of pain tolerance comes from the ability (or lack thereof) to regulate the 
emotional component of pain, which requires one to be able to react to the sensory aspect in a 
way that lessens the pain experience. The very nature of pain perception as affectively laden 
suggests that it characteristically violates informational encapsulation and thus modularity.  
 





It has been argued that pain is not compatible with a strong representationalist/intentionalist view 
of perception (Aydede 2009, 2017). As such, the perceptual status of pain is contentious. Similar 
considerations will surely provide a tempting line of argument to push back against the use of 
pain perception as a counterexample to modularity. For example, although folk understandings 
of pain locate it in the parts of the body in which it is felt, pain experience does not represent any 
associated physiological damage. We know that pain information—like the painful sensation 
responsible for a headache—is created by the nociceptive system, which is an internal system, 
quite unlike an external, perceptual object. The physiology of pain makes it a tricky case for 
representationalism, since pain routinely occurs in (and in a sense, it is created by) the body 
without an identifiable object of stimulation that the given pain state can be said to strongly 
represent. Accordingly, it is argued that pain is never really “in” the part of the body in which it 
is felt, and thus, does not necessarily fit within a traditional strong representationalist framework.  
 
Whether pain counts as perceptual will of course depend on what the nature of perception is. As 
we have seen already in relation to somatosensory perception, some views take stringent criteria 
for distinguishing perception proper from something like sensory registration or stimulation. One 
way of dealing with this objection could be to insist that, despite its asymmetry to visual 
perception, pain is representational. While it does not appear to represent objective conditions of 
tissue damage, it still represents a kind of internal dysregulation or disruption. Such a view 
would accommodate nociceptive pain, the kind associated with actual or potential tissue damage, 
and functional pain, the kind associated with chronic conditions like fibromyalgia. A view such 
as this can preserve the intuition that perception requires representation of some sort while 




that the kind of representation at work does not perfectly mimic that of vision or other 
exteroceptive qualities. This kind of reinterpretation of pain-as-representation can accommodate 
the more “psychosomatic” pain cases, such as phantom limb pain and chronic pain. Basically, 
pain may represent that there is something wrong going on 
internally/physiologically/psychologically, but this may not be tissue damage specifically. 
 
However, because the perceptuality of pain is controversial, it will be worthwhile to focus on the 
top-down modulation of other somatosensory faculties. Indeed, somatosensory faculties such as 
tactile perception and proprioception are susceptible to top-down influences as well. The next 
section will consider some experimental evidence for the top-down modulation of tactile 
perception.  
 
3.2. The top-down modulation of tactile perception 
 
Tactile perception is probably the most uncontroversially perceptual faculty of the 
somatosensory type. Tactile perception seems to represent objects with some kind of perceptual 
constancy mechanisms, seeming very similar to visual perception indeed. Tactile perception is 
capable of sensing both interoceptive and exteroceptive information, making it a suitable faculty 
to illustrate the tendency for somatosensory faculties to process top-down and bottom-up 
information.  
 
An illustrative example of the top-down modulation of tactile perception is that tactile sensitivity 




through factors like widening of the eyes and thus increasing the visual field, fear appears to 
decrease tactile sensitivity. For example, Kelly & Schmeichel (2014) found that recalling a 
fearful autobiographical memory caused subjects to perform poorly on a two-point 
discrimination test (compared with those who were instructed to recall a neutral or anger-
inducing memory). In effect, those in the fear condition were less successful at discriminating 
between one or two-points of sensation, which indicates decreased tactile sensitivity. The control 
conditions of neutral and anger-inducing memory suggest that it is the specific emotion—fear—
and not something like distraction from the cognitive task of recalling a specific memory, which 
causes the effect on tactile perception. What this phenomenon indicates is that tactile perception 
is susceptible to top-down effects, making it a problem for a modular view of perception.12  
 
We have now seen that the architectural theory appears unable to explain the distinction between 
SP from cognition. And thus, we have seen the inability of the architectural theory to explain 
perception (in general) from cognition. There may be evidence for the modularity of visual 
perception, but SP does not appear to be modular. Next, we shall consider further theories on the 
nature of the border between perception and cognition, to see if they offer the resources needed 
to accommodate SP as a type of perception that is distinct from cognition. 
 
4. Perceptual format 
 
 
12 I suspect that the bodily nature of affective experience makes it such that most, if not all, 
bodily faculties are influenced by emotion in this way, although proving this would be best left 




One can also appeal to the format of perceptual information to distinguish perception from 
cognition (Block 2014; Carey 2009; Burge 2018). On this view, perception features iconic 
representations, while cognition represents discursively (linguistically). This view certainly fits 
with how we may intuitively think about the difference between thinking and seeing. An iconic 
representation, roughly, is one “…marked by natural correspondences between units of 
representation and entities in the represented subject matter” (Burge 2018, p. 80). Typically, 
iconic representations contain a 1-1 mapping between features of the representation and features 
of the thing represented. In other words, the representation does not contain elements that are not 
representative of elements of the thing represented. The iconic view seems to capture the nature 
of visual perception quite well. The objects we see in visual perception are represented iconically 
in that there is a natural correspondence between the features of a visual representation of a given 
perceptual object/stimulus and the object/stimulus that the representation is representing.13  
 
Does SP represent iconically? One initial intuition may be that somatosensory representations are 
not iconic, but this may be due to the fact that it is quite natural to think of iconic representations 
as pictoral representations. However, they need not be. Iconic representations often are pictoral, 
but a non-pictoral representation could still do the job of representing units which naturally 
correspond to entities in the thing represented. In fact, somatotopic maps—neural maps of the 
body underlying somatosensory representation—seem to be iconic in just this way. While we 
may not have a pictoral representation of our body in our brain, there is a spatial representation 
 
13 Although the view that perception is iconic is intuitively appealing, Quilty-Dunn (2020) does 
argue that the nature of object perception shows that visual perception is both iconic and 
discursive. If this is true, it means that perception cannot be distinguished from cognition on the 





(meaning a map containing the information about our body-as-perceptual-object without 
necessarily representing this information pictorally).  
 
While it might appear now that SP is a perfect example of iconicity, this may not quite be so. 
One salient issue is the fact that the spatial body as a perceptual object makes sense in iconic 
terms, but the particular, modality-specific content that is then represented and felt in parts of the 
body does not. In illustrating this issue, we can turn to debates about the representationality of 
pain, for an analogous problem is at work. Strong representationalism requires that 
representational content determines phenomenal content. That means that there cannot be 
phenomenal qualities that are not caused by or found in the corresponding representational state. 
Similarly, iconicity requires that each representational part correspond to part of the 
representatum (the object being represented). The issue is then, for SP, that somatosensory 
representations often contain information that is not necessarily present in the thing represented. 
The nature of bodily sensation/perception is that there is not the same kind of identifiable, 
external stimulus that perceptual representations are about. While the spatial, bodily location of 
somatosensory representation seems to fit with an iconic format, the representational content of a 
given state, that which determines what the somatosensory representation contains and is about, 
does not. For example, as has been argued about pain, it is not “in” the body part in which it is 
felt. Even in cases where there is an identifiable stimulus such as the sharp edge of a coffee table 
that, when my knee bumps against it, serves to stimulate a pain in my knee, the pain is not in the 
object or really in the body part in which the pain is felt. Thus, there is content represented 
perceptually that does not appear to correspond to the thing represented—whether it be the body 





We can illustrate the issue at hand with another kind of example, for instance, with tactile 
perception. Even though tactile perception seems to represent objects exteroceptively, we also 
have a great deal of variance in tactile sensitivity throughout various parts of our body. This very 
fact means that tactile information will be more-or-less intense or detailed depending on which 
part of the body is stimulated.14 What’s more, the feeling of rough fabric against skin, for 
instance, while representing some features of an external stimulus (such as texture), seems to 
once again characteristically violate the requirements of iconicity. The feeling of roughness in x 
location, the specifically tactile sensory component that can represented in somatosensory 
perception, is not really “in” the thing represented, whether it be our body part of an external 
stimulus. We seem to have content that cannot be mapped onto the thing represented, even 
though the somatosensory state will represent the body plus tactile stimulation at x location as 
such an event exists mind-dependently.  
 
If we were just talking about the perceptual representation of body position, as in proprioception, 
it seems once again quite intuitive that an iconic view might work. However, we now know that 
somatotopic maps of the body, and thus somatosensory representations, are not spatially 
isomorphic with the body. Indeed, more sensitive areas of the body (such as the face and hands) 
are represented as larger in relation to body parts which they are not larger than in reality. This 
sort of thing shouldn’t count as illusory because it is consistent and functional. It isn’t a 
malfunctioning of the system, for this is how the system is designed to work. However, it does 
 
14 See Akins (1997) for a discussion of how sensory systems, such as thermoception, do not 
objectively track qualities of the external environment in the way that traditional philosophical 




cause (at least prima-facie) issues for the possibility of SP as being represented in an iconic 
format. Additionally, because of the strongly multi-modal nature of SP, it seems unlikely that 
proprioception alone could suffice to qualify the iconic view as fit for distinguishing 
somatosensory perception from cognition.  
 
5. The criterion of stimulus-dependence 
 
Another candidate for marking the perception/cognition distinction is the idea that perception is 
stimulus dependent, while cognition is not (Beck 2017). This view makes a great deal of intuitive 
sense, as perception and cognition typically have different objects. Perception, on a 
representationalist view, forms a proximal stimulus from a distal stimulus (the “object” of 
perception as it were).15 While it is possible for the content of thought to reference an external 
object (“The view outside is beautiful!”), it does not require reference to an external object. 
Thoughts and beliefs can be perceptually grounded without being perceptions. Conversely, to 
perceive something visually, one requires a relationship to the object of perception, or the distal 
stimulus. Thus, Beck concludes, perception is necessarily stimulus dependent, and cognition is 
not. While the view does have a great deal of appeal, it is once again a theory of what separates 
vision (and perhaps other exteroceptive faculties) from cognition, not what separates bodily 
perception, such as SP, from cognition. Beck does acknowledge that stimulus dependence will 
likely not be the sole criterion by which to distinguish perception from cognition. Still, as we will 
see, it isn’t clear that it can (at least without some further additions) be used as a criterion for 







It is difficult to see how SP can be explained by the stimulus-dependence view, because the 
relevant perceptual phenomena need not be (and routinely is not) dependent on an external 
stimulus. For example, while pain is often caused by an identifiable object or stimulus (stubbing 
your toe), in many cases it occurs without such an object (a headache). However, the role pain 
plays in both cases seems to be the same (or at least sufficiently similar). If pain is not dependent 
on an identifiable, external stimulus, it shows that stimulus dependence cannot be that which 
differentiates perception from cognition. We will see the same problem at work in all cases of 
somatosensory perception. Even the faculty of touch, while often involving an external stimulus, 
need not. It is possible (and quite ordinary) to have tactile stimulation without an external 
stimulus, such as the tactile input I receive as I stretch my fingers outward into space. No 
identifiable external stimulus is present, and yet, tactile information is still being processed and 
represented. I am constantly receiving tactile input from my body, which makes it possible to 
feel/attend to parts of my body such as my fingertips even when no identifiable stimulation from 
an outside object is occurring. The origin of this information—or that which causes the sensory 
experience—seems to be endogenous (internal), rather than exogenous (external). A further 
example is thermoreception. Although the body can detect external temperature, such as one 
does when testing the water from a faucet, thermoreceptors also detect the body’s own 
temperature. Indeed, thermoreceptors in the body’s subcutaneous tissues (the innermost layer of 
skin and connected tissues) serve to detect and regulate the body’s internal temperature. For 
example, an injury and subsequent inflammation may cause a particular part of the body to feel 





Beck’s view is not inherently unable to accommodate SP, but it doesn’t clearly accommodate it, 
either. Although there is no explicit statement of the required stimulus being external, the picture 
Beck paints, using vision as a model, certainly suggests it. The language of visual stimuli—a 
“distal stimulus” for example—is defined as something external to the perceiver. In contrast, in 
SP (proprioception, for instance), the perceptual object is often part one’s own body, and thus not 
a perceiver-independent object. While it seems right to say that in cases of SP, the stimulus is 
bodily, and not that there is no stimulus in cases of SP, accommodating bodily stimuli could 
weaken the original formulation of the criterion. Relying on an internal or physiological stimulus 
could apply to cognitive states, and thus, cease to serve as the criterion which demarcates 
perception from cognition. Allowing the perceptual stimulus to be part of the perceiver herself 
seems to then allow cognitive states to have stimuli as well, for cognitive states are dependent on 
neural/brain-based stimulation. We could try to specify a brain-based vs non-brain-based 
stimulus, such that cognitive states depend on brain-based, not sensory stimuli, but doing so 
would require putting cranial constraints on cognition, potentially opening the door to problems 
if one is sympathetic to embodied accounts of cognition. While these considerations do not 
definitively show that Beck’s account couldn’t be modified or specified to account for bodily 
perception such as SP, it doesn’t give us a clear or intuitive way to do so.  
 
Beck does use a potentially useful idea to explain certain cases of hallucination: perceptions are 
aimed at being, or function as, stimulus-dependent (Ibid. p. 8). In the case of pain, this could 
work, and is similar to the way that representationalism about pain has been defended. However, 
there are many faculties that are not functionally (external)stimulus-dependent, either. An 




at stimulus-dependence such that the cases of touch that don’t have an external stimulus are 
somehow deviations from the function of tactile perception. Tactile perception seems just as 
functionally linked with multi-modal representations of the body, limb/finger movements, etc., 
as it is to perceiving the shape and texture of external objects. From what we know about SP, it 
seems to function primarily to represent the body as a perceptual object. Thus, the functional-
stimulus solution is likely to fall short if we aren’t sure how to include/characterize bodily 
stimuli in the first place. Once again, while this does not necessarily discount Beck’s view, it 
does show that there are initial difficulties in applying the stimulus-dependence criterion to cases 
of bodily perception, such as SP. Turning to perceptual function is the right direction, but the 
actual function of perception, taking SP into account, is best framed in terms of change-
detection. This idea will be developed in the final sections.  
 
The best option for the stimulus-dependence view would be to specify the type of stimulus that 
perception requires. We know that brain-based vs non-brain based may not work, so perhaps 
specifying the relevant stimulus as a sensory stimulus could do the job. A sensory stimulus could 
be that which stimulates sensory receptors. Could that still apply to the brain and thus to 
cognition? Possibly, but it is certainly unlikely that all cognitive states would necessarily depend 
on the stimulation of sensory neurons in the brain.  
 
An issue with this type of definition—a sensory stimulus is a stimulus which stimulates sensory 
receptors—is that it is a circular. What is a sensory stimulus? That which stimulates sensory 
receptors. What is a sensory receptor? That which is sensitive to or stimulated by a sensory 




means to be perceptual (or sensory) in the first place, and with this view, we aren’t quite there. 
As such, the stimulus-dependence view could, with some modifications and specifications be 
promising, but is not completely satisfactory. So, while the stimulus-dependence view is quite 
good as compared to the other border views, it may be worth exploring further options.  
 
6. Anti-border views 
 
Lastly is the view which denies the existence of a border or is at least skeptical about the 
existence of one. For example, a predictive coding view asserts that perceptual systems will use 
whatever information is relevant to the given perceptual task to minimize prediction error 
(Lupyan & Clarke 2015). That means that bottom-up information from a sensory stimulus will 
not solely determine the perceptual representation of the given perceptual object, but that top-
down and bottom-up information routinely work together to create the most accurate predictions 
of sensory stimuli. On such a view, top-down effects of cognition on perception are just part of 
normal perceptual processing.  
 
However, predictive processing views of perception typically are silent on, or outwardly deny, 
the existence of a perception/cognition border (e.g., Lupyan 2015). This is perhaps because the 
border is most commonly cashed out in architectural terms, and the architectural view 
(modularity) holds that perception is differentiated from cognition because cognition cannot 
influence it. Thus, it may be that in denying the existence of a border, what is really being denied 
is the existence of an architectural border. However, to say that predictive perception is indeed 




effects—we need to be able to identify perception as a distinct type of thing from cognition. 
While the predictive processing view makes sense in terms of how perception works, it does not 
really make sense as a perspective on the border, as it seems to simultaneously imply that 
perception as a phenomenon exists but cannot be distinguished from cognition. If both 
perception and cognition can make use of top-down and bottom-up information, we’ll need to 
define the categories in some way that doesn’t have to do with informational encapsulation, 
stimulus-dependence, or perceptual format.  
 
Despite the incomprehensibility of cognitive penetration without a difference between cognition 
and perception, it does seem plausible that SP operates along the lines of a predictive coding 
view. The fact that SP violates informational encapsulation and requires a mental representation 
of the body in order to represent bodily information as spatial, suggests that it does indeed 
combine top-down and bottom-up information/processing in its formation of representations. 
However, whether this aspect of SP can only be explained as predictive coding specifically is a 
distinct question from one about the kinds of information that SP uses. Predictive coding views 
also involve positing a predictive, probabilistic element. Somatosensory information could be 
susceptible to top-down modulation without being probabilistically represented/processed. 
However, the converse of this is not true.  
 
A decent amount of empirical work on SP proposes that it is best explained by a predictive 
processing (predictive coding) view. A relevant example is that predictive processing is proposed 
as an explanation of the mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of placebo analgesia (Wiech et 




representation of a painful stimulus to be of less intensity than if it were expected to be of more 
intensity. Work on placebo analgesia looks to understand how our expectation or belief that we 
are taking something to relieve our pain does in fact relieve our pain, without chemical 
intervention. A predictive processing view of perception holds that this is just how perception 
works; our prior expectations of what a stimulus will be like will influence the perceptual 
representation of a given stimulus.  
 
However, predictive coding views are silent on what the difference is between perception and 
cognition. Even if perception can make use of whatever information is necessary to create the 
most accurate prediction, including cognitive information, that there would still need to be some 
criteria with which to distinguish the two in the first place. A helpful idea comes from Prinz 
(2006), who argues that while there is some functional distinction between modalities, the 
frequency of top-down effects on perception make the border rather weak.  
 
While it is not conclusive that, necessarily, extant theories on the nature of the 
perception/cognition border cannot explain or accommodate the nature of somatosensory 
perception, it doesn’t exactly look promising. The views surveyed (except for predictive 
processing, although other issues have been raised) all have difficulty when applied to the bodily, 
somatosensory faculties, and thus, it may be worthwhile to investigate other options. The nature 
of somatosensory perception may require a departure from visuo-centric, or at least extero-
centic, views of perception, in favor of a theory which recognizes the distinct yet related nature 
of different kinds of perceptual faculty; in particular, the different kinds of information that they 




the problems of the previous border theories. In addition, it could be the missing piece required 
to distinguish perception from cognition in predictive processing views, for it does not require 
that perceptual and cognitive information be of fundamentally different kinds or be subject to 
architectural or informational constraints. Rather, it requires that they serve different functions, 
or do different things. The rest of this paper lays out the basic idea behind a functional border, 
and why it is an intuitive solution to the issues raised thus far.  
 
7. Perception as function 
 
Why do we perceive at all? The evolutionary answer would be to detect changes in the 
environment relevant to our survival. In considering the answer, it is useful to entertain what 
would happen to an organism in a complex environment without any ability to perceive. While 
an individual without one of more perceptual faculties can get on very successfully in the world 
today, due to innovative uses of other faculties and technology, this wouldn’t have always been 
the case.  For example: pain functions by alerting us when something in our environment (this 
could be external environment, as in the case of a hot stove, or internal environment, as in the 
case of a tooth or stomachache) is dangerous for us (or, conversely, if something is good for us). 
Without the ability to feel pain, our chance of survival is slim. We know this from people who 
are born with congenital analgesia—the disorder which causes individuals to not experience 
pain. Those with congenital analgesia are at high risk for serious injury and early death, as they 
are not able to detect when something is wrong with their bodies in many situations.16 For 
 
16 While there have only been about 20 confirmed cases of congenital analgesia, those affected 





example: someone with congenital analgesia would not have the proper response to putting their 
hand on a hot stove, and thus would suffer extensive tissue damage because they lack the alert 
system of pain perception. For those of us with normal pain experience, the discomfort would 
cause us to immediately withdraw our hand from the stove, minimizing the damage. What’s 
more, the painful experience would likely cause us to be cautious around hot stoves in the future.  
 
Or, alternatively, consider a different sort of example: single-celled organisms use something 
like touch/smell when they detect the presence of harmful stimuli in their environment through 
chemotaxis.17 When we look across diverse kinds of living systems, we see that basic forms of 
change-detection regarding both external and internal environments are present. Perception—
broadly construed—is required evolutionarily for organisms to detect harm and maintain 
homeostasis among other things such as finding mates, food, etc. The necessity and 
fundamentality of perception give credence to the idea that perception is functionally distinct 
from cognition.18 Organisms that may not be cognitive can still perceive, or at the very least, 
sense.  
 
7.1. The perception/cognition border as a functional border 
 
The function of perception, I argue, is change-detection. The function of perception as change 
detection can explain what distinguishes perceptual faculties such as the bodily faculties and 
vision/audition from cognition. A functional theory of the perception/cognition border has the 
 
17 As mentioned earlier, views like Burge’s (2010) do not count the chemical senses as properly 





benefit of serving as a common factor among each of the considered perceptual modalities. 
Perception as a mechanism for change-detection easily and intuitively explains why we have 
vision, taste, smell, audition, pain, touch, proprioception, etc. in the first place. Take smell: smell 
allows us to quickly detect the freshness of the food we eat, and to quickly detect the presence of 
food. We may not commonly think about this, for we make use of multiple perceptual modalities 
in conjunction to get this information (I might pay more attention to how juicy the red 
strawberries look rather than my ability to smell their freshness). But the main idea is that we 
have smell for this purpose. Anyone who has ever left a container of beans in the fridge for too 
long will know that they give off a terrible smell when they are no longer fit to eat, a smell which 
serves as a more powerful indicator that they are no longer safe to consume than their visual 
appearance. Creatures with differently developed visual systems (dogs for example—they can’t 
see colour) rely very heavily on smell to simply navigate the world.  
 
An example on the bodily end is proprioception. Proprioception allows us to perceive our body 
position, which is necessary for ensuring that we do not knock into objects, and coordinates with 
the vestibular system to ensure we can simply balance, thus stand up and walk. As in a previous 
example above, the proprioceptive system primes my body for movement when I encounter 
relevant stimuli. If I experience a change in my environment that poses a threat, my 
proprioceptive system primes accordingly. If I am walking and I encounter some uneven ground, 
my proprioceptive system adjusts to ensure I maintain balance. While smell and proprioception 
may not seem like they have much in common, they both serve the same function: they monitor 
the environment (internal and external) for changes that are relevant to the survival, well-being 





As we have seen, the architectural view, the format view, and the stimulus-dependence view all 
run into problems when they are tasked with explaining cases of SP. This appears to be because 
they are, at bottom, theories of visual perception, although they may accommodate or extend to 
audition. In particular, the inability is exposed when they are applied to cases of bodily 
perception, like pain, proprioception, and touch, because these bodily or pseudo-internal faculties 
seem to work differently from vision and other extero-faculties. A functional theory, in contrast, 
applies to perception as a category, and what distinguishes that category from cognition. Rather 
than appealing to the particularities of a given faculty, the functional view looks to perception as 
a holistic phenomenon and builds a theory from there.  
 
Framing the border in functional terms has multiple upshots in addition to explaining a common 
feature among distinct perceptual modalities. This view does not have to assume a substantive 
distinction between internal and external perception. This matters for pain perception, but also 
for proprioception and all senses which primarily receive bodily information. Generally, if 
perception demands an external source as a cause, as the stimulus-dependence view seems to, it 
is going to turn out that much of one’s own-body perception does not count as perceptual. The 
inclusion of the bodily faculties is a strength, because an internal/external divide seems arbitrary 
and unnecessarily restrictive. As work in embodied cognition has argued, the body is necessary 
for performing all kinds of perceptual and cognitive tasks that may not at first appear to involve 
the body. Posing an internal/external divide may pose problems for many cases of multi-modal 
perception as well. For example: body ownership, which relies on visual, proprioceptive and 




phenomenon only if bodily perception is indeed perception.19 The bodily faculties in particular 
are strongly multi-modal (for example, the vestibular system, that which is primarily responsible 
for our senses of balance) but all modalities function in multi-modal ways.20 However, an 
internal/external divide could possibly be considered a strength to someone who wanted to argue 
for a narrower view of what counts as perceptual, perhaps in order to preserve one of the more 
traditional theories previously mentioned. Further, the functional theory answers the question of 
why we perceive in the first place, and how it serves our evolutionary needs. Contemporarily, we 
may tend to think of our perceptual faculties as primarily ways to experience aesthetic pleasure 
and gather information (that is not immediately relevant to our survival). However, just because 
we use perceptual faculties in this way, does not mean that it is why we have them in the first 
place.  
 
It may be tempting to bring up the fact that we can perceive neutral states as well—that detecting 
change requires detecting the absence of stimuli. This seems correct and completely in line with 
the functional account I am providing. The ability to detect a change would require that we are 
first  aware of what the initial state of affairs feels like. Change is only detectable if the previous 
state or lack of information is detectable as well. I may not be able to detect pain in my body if I 
could not feel my body without pain (certainly the spatial location would be difficult, such as in 
the earlier case of somatic vs visceral pain). I could not feel a change in the position of my leg if 
I could not feel what it was like before it moved. As such, the fact that we perceive resting 
 
19 The illusion, first documented by Botvinick and Cohen (1998), features the tactile stimulation 
of both a subject’s actual hand, which is hidden to the subject, and a rubber hand, which is 
visible to the subject. Both real and rubber hands are given synchronous touches (such as strokes 
from a paintbrush), which, in conjunction with the perception of the rubber hand as the visible 





states—or have static, unchanging perceptions—does not mean that the function of perception is 
not change-detection. Indeed, quite the opposite. The ability to perceive neutral or static states is 
necessary for being able to detect changes in our internal and external environment.  
 
While this paper is not offering a theory of cognitive function at present, it should be clear that 
the function of cognition is not that same as the function of perception. To suggest, for argument, 
that the function of cognition is also change-detection, would be a waste of time. Cognition 
allows us to use what we detect through our various perceptual faculties in higher-level 
processing. While cognition seems to use perceptual information, its basic job as part of a human 
(or non-human animal) is more advanced than what perception’s is. So, even without a clear 
account of what the function of cognition is, it should still be quite acceptable that whatever it is, 
it is not the same as perception’s. And for my purposes, there may be no one thing that is 
cognition; that would pose no issues for the theory of perception-as-functional-kind proposed 
here.  
 
A likely issue to be raised is that framing the function of perception in this way is too broad. 
Framing the function of perception as change detection means that there is no distinction to be 
made between perception and sensation. But really, all this means is that there is no functional 
difference between perception and sensation, not that there is no difference between sensation 
and perception in other ways. As previously discussed in relation to the representationality and 
thus, likely perceptuality of SP, there is a difference between sensation and perception, and that 




from cognition on the same grounds, without it being true that sensation and perception are being 




This chapter has argued that somatosensory perception provides a difficult case for extant 
theories on the nature of the perception/cognition border, particularly the architectural view. 
Specifically, somatosensory faculties, such as pain and tactile perception, appear to routinely 
make use of top-down information, thus violating the criterion of informational encapsulation. 
Additionally, it looks to whether competing theories on the nature of the perception/cognition 
border can accommodate somatosensory perception as a type of perception that is distinct from 
cognition, before concluding that a new theoretical approach to the border is likely needed. 
Finally, it offers some initial considerations in favor of a new theory of the border: that cognition 















Are the bodily senses properly perceptual in the same kind of way that vision and audition are? 
Are they thus the same kind of thing as uncontroversially perceptual modalities, such as vision 
and audtion? It is not completely clear, but it is possible. This dissertation has given 
considerations for why they are similar but also theoretical possibilities to account for their 
similarities and differences. To settle the score more conclusively, more work must be done. But 
here, we have a good start.  
 
I have thus demonstrated the fruitfulness of including the bodily modalities in questions 
pertaining to the nature of perception and questions typically dominated by a focus on vision. 
This means that including the bodily sense modalities enriches the philosophical study of 
perception by forcing us to critically examine what perception is in the first place. Vision has 
typically been treated as synonymous with vision, but as I show, this treatment may be 
problematic. In addition, I have demonstrated that the bodily modalities are deserving of a proper 
consideration by the philosophy of perception, for even if they are not the same kind of thing as 
vision and audition, and thus properly perceptual in some strict sense, their nature is sufficiently 
complex and interesting. Thus, they are relevant to philosophical work seeking to understand the 
nature of perception.  
 
The first chapter argues that the bodily senses ought to be differentiated from the non-bodily 
ones for the fact that bodily senses necessarily detect and represent subjective information. This 




category of bodily perception. While the bodily senses might intuitively be thought of as 
“subjective” in the slightly pejorative use of the term, what I mean by “subjective” is of or about 
the subject. I go on to show that, while the bodily senses give us subjective information in that 
they give us information about the subject, subjective information is epistemically valuable. The 
second half of this chapter thus identifies and explains the kinds of things the bodily senses give 
us epistemic information about, and the value of this sort of epistemic information.  
 
The second chapter argues philosophical accounts that distinguish sensation and perception as 
types of modalities, and in turn isolate the bodily modalities as sensory and not properly 
perceptual, are mistaken. I use examples of bodily modalities that bear traditional characteristics 
of perceptuality such as representationality, spatiality, and objectification, to show that the bodily 
modalities are more like uncontroversially perceptual modalities such as vision than some 
philosophical counts suppose. I also, before concluding, considered a novel proposal: that the 
sensation/perception distinction exists not as a binary but as a spectrum. This view would 
account for the differences and similarities between the bodily modalities and modalities such as 
vision and audition without the view that they are of fundamentally different kinds.  
 
The final chapter assesses whether theories on the nature of the perception/cognition border can 
accommodate bodily modalities, particularly the somatosensory ones such as touch, pain, 
proprioception, and thermoception. Specifically, I argue that extant theories of the nature of the 
perception/cognition border, such as the architectural view, format view, and stimulus-
dependence view, cannot easily or straightforwardly accommodate somatosensory perception--




concluding, I consider a potential theoretical alternative that avoids the (at least potential) 
problems of the extant theories: a functional border between perception and cognition. The 
function of perception can be formulated as change detection, and this function can differentiate 
perception from cognition.  
 
What is not addressed by this dissertation? Naturally, quite a lot. For starters, two of the chapters 
sketch views which really require more development if they are to be seriously considered: the 
first is the perceptual function view; the second is the perception-sensation spectrum view. These 
views are both entertained at the ends of chapters 2 and 3, respectively, and could probably each 
form the basis of an entire dissertation themselves. The intention was just to include them as 
potential alternatives, not to present them as fully worked out accounts.  
 
In addition, looming in the background of this work is the question of whether perception is a 
natural kind. And if not, what kind of thing is it? One of the questions addressed in this 
dissertation, particularly that of whether the bodily modalities are the same kind of thing as 
vision etc., hinges on what kind of thing perception is in the first place. Thus, the question of 
whether the bodily senses belong in the perception category can probably not be conclusively 
answered without understanding the nature of perception as a kind of thing. However, that does 
not mean that we cannot, as I have done, begin thinking about the question in terms of the ways 
that the bodily senses bear similarities to uncontroversially perceptual faculties, and are thus 







Ackerley, R., Aimonetti, J. & Ribot-Ciscar, E. (2017). Emotions alter muscle proprioceptive 
coding of movements in humans. Sci Rep 7, 8465. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-
08721-4 
Adolfi, F., Couto, B., Richter, F., Decety, J., Lopez, J., Sigman, M., Manes, F., & Ibáñez, A. 
(2017). Convergence of interoception, emotion, and social cognition: A twofold fMRI 
meta-analysis and lesion approach. Cortex, 88(124). ISSN 0010-9452, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2016.12.019. 
Akins, K. (1997). Of Sensory Systems and the 'Aboutness' of Mental States, The Journal of 
Philosophy, 93(7), 337-372.  
Anderson, E. (1995a). Feminist epistemology: An interpretation and defense. Hypatia, 10, 50–
84. 
Anderson, E. (1995b). Knowledge, human interests, and objectivity in feminist epistemology. 
Philosophical Topics, 23, 27–58. 
Anderson, E., Willett, C., & Meyers, D. (2020). Feminist perspectives on the self. The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/feminism-self/ 





Aydede, M. (2017). Pain: perception of introspection? The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of 
Pain. J. Corns (ed.), London: Routledge.  
Barrett L.F., & Simmons, W.K. (2015). Interoceptive predictions in the brain. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience.  
Beck, J. (2017). Marking the perception--cognition boundary: The criterion of stimulus-
dependence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.  
Block, N. (2014). Seeing-as in the light of vision science. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 89(3), 560–572. 
Botvinick, M. and Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see. Nature, 391(6669).  
Bordo, S. (2003). Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and The Body. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Braams, B.R., Blechert, J., Boden, M.T., & Gross, J.J. (2012). The effects of acceptance and 
suppression on anticipation and receipt of painful stimulation. Journal of Behavior 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 43(4), 1014-1018. doi: 
10.1016/j.jbtep.2012.04.001  
Brewer, R., Cook, R., & Bird, G. (2016) Alexithymia: A general deficit of  interoception. R. Soc. 
open sci., 3, 150664. http://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.150664. 
Briscoe, M. E. (2019). Bodily awareness and novel multisensory features. Synthese, SI: 
Between Vision and Action. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02156-2.  





Burge, T. (2010). The Origins of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.  
Burge, T. (2018). Iconic representation: Maps, pictures, and perception.  In: Wuppuluri S., Doria 
F. (eds) The Map and the Territory. The Frontiers Collection. Springer, Cham. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72478-2_5 
Ceunen, E., Vlaeyen, J. W. S., & Van Diest, I. (2016). On the origin of interoception. Front. 
Psychol., 23. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00743 
Chen, L., Friedman, R., & Roe, A. (2003). Optical Imaging of a Tactile Illusion in Area 3b of the 
Primary Somatosensory Cortex. Science, 302(5646): 881-885 DOI: 
10.1126/science.1087846. 
Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. New York, 
NY: Avon. 
de Sousa, R (1987). The Rationality of Emotion, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
de Vignemont, F. Henrik H. Ehrsson, H. H., and Haggard, P. (2005). Bodily Illusions Modulate 
Tactile Perception. Current Biology, Elsevier, 2005, 15, pp.1286-1290 
de Vignemont, F. (2017). Pain and Touch, The Monist,100(4): Pages 465–477, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onx022 
Ehrsson, H. H. (2020). Multisensory Processes in Body Ownership. In K. Sathian and V.S. 
Ramachandran (eds.), Multisensory Perception,179-200. Academic Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812492-5.00008-5.  
Fauchon, C., Faillenot, I., Quesada, C. et al. (2019). Brain activity sustaining the modulation of 




Firestone & Scholl (2016). Cognition does not affect perception: evaluating the evidence for 
“top-down” effects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39(229). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X15000965 
Fodor, J. (1983). The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Ford, B.Q., & Gross, J.J. (2018). Emotion regulation: Why beliefs matter. Canadian Psychology, 59, 
1-14. DOI:10.1037/cap0000142 
Sarah N. Garfinkel, Anil K. Seth, Adam B. Barrett, Keisuke Suzuki, Hugo D. Critchley, (2015). 
Knowing your own heart: Distinguishing interoceptive accuracy from interoceptive 
awareness, Biological Psychology 104, 65-74. ISSN 0301-0511, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2014.11.004. 
Gaudio S, Brooks SJ, Riva G (2014). Nonvisual Multisensory Impairment of Body Perception in 
Anorexia Nervosa: A Systematic Review of Neuropsychological Studies. PLOS ONE 
9(10): e110087. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0110087 
Ghafur, R.D., Suri, G., & Gross, J.J. (2018). Emotion regulation choice: The role of orienting 
attention and action readiness. Behavioral Sciences, 19: 31-35. DOI: 
10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.08.016 
Gligorov, N. (2017). Don't worry, this will only hurt a bit: The role of expectation and attention 
in pain intensity. The Monist, 100(4), 501–513. 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2018). The Evolution of Consciousness in Phylogenetic Context. In Kristin 
Andrews and Jacob Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal 
Minds. New York, NY: Routledge, 216-226. 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2020). Metazoa: Animal Life and the Birth of the Mind. New York: Farrar, 




R. H. Gracely, M. E. Geisser, T. Giesecke, M. A. B. Grant, F. Petzke, D. A. Williams, D. J. 
Clauw (2004). Pain catastrophizing and neural responses to pain among persons  with 
fibromyalgia,  Brain 127(4): 835–843. 
Gross, J.J. (2014). Emotion regulation: Conceptual and empirical foundations. In J.J. Gross (ed.), 
Handbook of emotion regulation (2nd ed.) (pp. 3-20). New York, NY: Guilford. 
Haggard, M. T. C., & Kennett, S. (2003). Tactile perception, cortical representation and the 
bodily self. Current Biology 13(5).  
Haggard, P., Iannetti, G. D., & Longo, M.R. (2013). Spatial sensory organization and body 
representation in pain perception. Curr Biol. 23(4), 164-76. doi: 
10.1016/j.cub.2013.01.047. PMID: 23428330. 
Hobson, A. R. & Aziz, Q. (2003). Central nervous system processing of Human Visceral Pain in 
Health and Disease. Physiology 18(3), 109-114.  
Haslanger, S. (1993). On being objective and being objectified. In Louise Antony and Charlotte 
Witt (eds.) A Mind of One’s Own. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Haslanger, S. (1995). Ontology and Social Construction,” Philosophical Topics, 23: 95–125. 
Heydrich Lukas, Walker Francesco, Blättler Larissa, Herbelin Bruno, Blanke Olaf, Aspell Jane 
Elizabeth (2021). Interoception and Empathy Impact Perspective Taking. Frontiers in 
Psychology 11. DOI=10.3389/fpsyg.2020.599429    ISSN=1664-1078    
James, W. (1884). What is an Emotion? Mind, 9(34), 188-205.  
Jones, L. A. (2003). Perceptual constancy and the perceived magnitude of muscle forces. Exp 




Keizer, A., Smeets, M. A. M., Dijkerman, C. H., van den Hout, M., Klugkist, I., van Elburg, A., 
& Postma, A. (2011). Tactile body image disturbance in anorexia nervosa. Psychiatry 
Research 190(1), 115-120. ISSN 0165-1781. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2011.04.031. 
Khalsa, S. S., Adolphs, R., Cameron, O. G., Critchley, H. D., Davenport, P. W., Feinstein, J. S., 
Feusner, J. D., Garfinkel, S. N., Lane, R. D., Mehling, W. E., Meuret, A. E., Nemeroff, C. 
B., Oppenheimer, S., Petzschner, F. H., Pollatos, O., Rhudy, J. L., Schramm, L. P., 
Simmons, W. K., Stein, M. B., Stephan, K. E., … Interoception Summit 2016 
participants  (2018). Interoception and Mental Health: A Roadmap. Biological 
psychiatry. Cognitive  neuroscience and neuroimaging, 3(6), 501–513. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bpsc.2017.12.004 
Kelley, N. J. & Schmeichel, B. J. (2014). The effects of negative emotions on sensory 
perception: fear but not anger decreases tactile sensitivity. Frontiers in Psychology, 22, 
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00942     
Kojima, M. (2012) Alexithymia as a prognostic risk factor for health problems: a brief review of 
epidemiological studies. Biopsychosoc. Med., 6(21). doi:10.1186/1751-0759-6-21 
Lederman, S., & Jones, L. (2011). Tactile and haptic illusions. IEEE Transactions on Haptics, 
4(4), 273-294. doi: 10.1109/TOH.2011.2. 
Lupyan, G. (2015). Cognitive penetrability of perception in the age of prediction: Predictive 
systems are penetrable systems. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6(4), 547–569.  
Lupyan, G., & Clarke, A. (2015). Worlds and the world: predictive coding and the language-





Mandelbaum, E. (2018). Seeing and conceptualizing: Modularity and the shallow contents of 
perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97(2), 267-283.  
Matthen, M. (2021). The dual structure of touch: The body vs peripersonal space. In Frédérique 
de Vignemont, Andrea Serino, Hong Yu Wong, and Alessandro Farnè (eds.), The World 
at Our Fingertips: A Multidisciplinary Exploration of Peripersonal Space. Oxford 
University Press.  
Maravita, A., Spence, C., & Driver, J. (2003). Multisensory integration and the body schema: 
Close to hand and within reach. Current Biology, 13(13), 531–
539. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0960-9822(03)00449-4  
Miller, L. E., Longo, M. R., & Saygin, A. P. (2016). Mental body representations retain 
homuncular shape distortions: Evidence from Weber's illusion. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 40, 17–25.  
Miller, L. E., & Farnѐ, A. (2019). Somatosensory cortex efficiently processes touch located 
beyond the body. Current Biology, 29(4), 4276-4283.  
Mul, C. L., Stagg, S. D., Herbelin, B., and Aspell, J. E. (2018). The feeling of me feeling for you: 
interoception, alexithymia and empathy in autism. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 48, 2953–2967. 
doi: 10.1007/s10803-018-3564-3 
Nudds, M. (2012). Origins of objectivity. Analysis, 72(1), 157-174.  
O’Callaghan, C. (2011). Lessons from beyond vision (sounds and audition). Philosophical 
Studies, 153(1), 143-160.  
O’Callaghan, C. (2017). Beyond Vision: Philosophical Essays. Oxford: OUP.  




Ondobaka S., Kilner J., Friston K. (2017). The role of interoceptive inference in theory of 
mind. Brain and Cognition, 111, 64–68. 
O’Shaughnessy, B. (1980). The Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Pace-Schott, E. F., Amole, M. C., Aue, T., Balconi, M., Bylsma, L. M., Critchley, H., Demaree, 
H. A., Friedman, B. H., Kotynski Gooding, A. E., Gosseries, O., Jovanovic, T., Kirby, L. 
A. J., Kozlowska, K., Laureys, S., Lowe, L., Magee, K., Marin, M. F., Merner, A. R., 
Robinson, J. L., Smith, R. C., Spangler, D. P., Van Overveld, M., VanElzakker, M. B., 
(2019). Physiological feelings. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 103: 267-304, 
ISSN 0149-7634, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.05.002. 
Prinz, J. (2006). Is the mind really modular? In R.J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in 
Cognitive Science. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 22–36. 
Prinz, J. (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford: OUP.  
Proffitt, D. R., Stefanucci, J. K., Banton, T. & Epstein, W. (2003). The role of effort in 
perceiving distance. Psychological Science, 14, 106–12.  
Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). Is vision contiguous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability 
of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 341-423.  
Qiyang, G., Xianjie, P., & Wei, C. (2019). Body influences on social cognition through  
interoception. Frontiers in Psychology, 10. 
https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02066. 




Quadt, L., Critchley, H.D. and Garfinkel, S.N. (2018). The neurobiology of interoception in 
health and disease. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci., 1428, 112-
128. https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.13915 
Quilty-Dunn, J. (2020). Perceptual pluralism. Noûs 54 (4), 807-838. 
Ravaja, N., Harjunen, V., Ahmed, I., Jacucci, G., & Spapé, M. M. (2017). Feeling touched: 
Emotional modulation of somatosensory potentials to interpersonal touch. Scientific 
reports, 7, 40504. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep40504 
Reid, T. (1764/1977). An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, D. 
R. Brookes (ed). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Ronchi, R., Parke, H. D., & Blanke, O. (2018). Bodily self-consciousness and its disorders. 
Handbook of Clinical Neurology, 151, 313–330. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-
63622-5.00015-2 
Romano, D., & Maravita, A. (2019). The dynamic nature of the sense of ownership after  brain 
injury. Clues from asomatognosia and somatoparaphrenia, Neuropsychologia, 132 
(107119) ISSN 0028-3932.  
Saadon-Grosman, N., Loewenstein, Y., & Shahar Arzy (2020). The ‘creatures’ of the human 
cortical somatosensory system, Brain Communications, 2(1).  
Sarafoleanu, C., Mella, C., Georgescu, M., & Perederco, C. (2009). The importance of the 
olfactory sense in the human behavior and evolution. Journal of medicine and life, 2(2), 
196–198. 
Shevlin, H., & Friesen, P. (2020). Pain, placebo, and cognitive penetration. Mind & 




Sullivan, M.J.L, Thorn, B., Haythornthwaite, J.A., Keefe, F., Martin, M., & Bradley, L.A. 
(2001). Theoretical perspectives on the relation between catastrophizing and pain. Clin J 
Pain, 17, 52–64. 
Seminowicz, D. A., & Davis, K. D. (2006). Cortical responses to pain in healthy individuals 
depend on pain catastrophizing. Pain, 120(3), 297-306.  
Shah, P., Catmur, C., and Bird, G. (2017). From heart to mind: Linking interoception, emotion, 
and theory of mind. Cortex, 93, 220-223. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2017.02.010 
Taylor, J. L. (2009). Proprioception. In Larry R. Squire (ed), Encyclopedia of Neuroscience. 
Academic Press, 1143-1149.  
Vallar, G., Ronchi, R. (2019). Somatoparaphrenia: a body delusion. A review of the 
Neuropsychological Literature. Exp Brain Res, 192, 533–555. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-008-1562-y. 
Wiech, K., Vandekerckhove, J., Zaman, J., Tuerlinckx, F., Vlaeyen, J. W., & Tracey, I. (2014). 
Influence of prior information on pain involves biased perceptual decision-
making. Current Biology, 24(15), R679–R681.  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.06.022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
  
 
 
 
